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VAN MIERT RAISES BUDGETARY, MISSILE ISSUES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 10 Sep 80 pp 22, 23

[Text] It has already been said that once again this year the top politicians in our country have not had a real vacation. In itself that is not surprising, since, after all, that has been the case for the past few years, too. You remember the way a government of Christian Democrats with the FDP [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] and the [Flemish] People's Union wrestled with reports from the Council of State all summer long 2 years ago and tried to cast the so-called Egmont Pact in a good form. Last year, another government, from which the People's Union had withdrawn in the meantime, tried to have another commonalty plan approved, and this year the government was having heavy weather of it until mid-August in forcing yet another altered concept of the constitution down the throats of parliament.

This time that did succeed, presumably in large part because the perennial point of dissension, Brussels, was set aside for the time being, but also because the articles which were put before parliament in the past few years were not really so different from one another and everyone, not only the ministers but the senators and chamber members, was fairly familiar with the material. Still, the relative peace was first disturbed by a commonalty incident once again, when Premier Martens and his most prominent members had to return from their vacations early to reach a decision on the question of the school in Komen because the authority responsible for that, Liege socialist Guy Mathot, either could not or would not clear up the matter himself.

None the less, it was primarily Karel Van Miert who reopened the political season and for once provided an incident that was not fraught with commonalty significance. In an interview with HET BELANG VAN LIMBURG, the SP [(Flemish) Socialist Party] chairman made a number of statements dealing with the budget hastily assembled in early August which suddenly reset the barometer in the Wetsstraat to the storm reading. As is well known, Van Miert talked about certain budgetary regulations disadvantageous to government workers, the defense budget and the stationing of nuclear rockets on our territory.

The fire Van Miert started in the government camp was not so easy to put out. After all, it was a matter of principles dear to the hearts of the SP chairman and his following, themes on which he is diametrically opposed to Walloon liberals like Jean Gol. What Van Miert primarily wanted to say, however, is that he is not a doormat that can be kicked all around the room, that he was willing to play along in this political tripartite coalition which is so important to the country--an argument that is always thrown up at him by his political opponents--and that he wants to respect the contract that was concluded this spring, but that in return he expects at least as much respect for the things that he represents and that he was able to insist upon in the coalition agreement.

Thus Van Miert rightly asked the government what it was thinking of doing about it, and disregarding a certain amount of abuse directed at him almost exclusively from the French-speaking corner--Jean Gol attacked him sharply, while in the PSC [Christian Social Party (French speaking)] newspaper LE RAPPEL, Pol Vandromme called Van Miert no more and no less than a deceiver of the people and a vulgar demagogue--he need not be too dissatisfied with the results of his sally, even though the three last topics that he brought up as independent are closely associated with one another and were discussed in the nuclear cabinet together, so that following the same logic Van Miert will be obliged to make a concession here and there.

However that may be, in the week following the SP chairman's statements, all the other chairmen of the majority were ready to admit as well that the special 2-percent assessment on the pay of all government employees, from the lowest assistant to the director general, really was perhaps overhastily introduced. The labor unions of the government employees had already announced a strike for 19 December and because they were already in the country because of the Komen matter, the government decided just to call the cabinet council together a week early and to take the disputed budget measure "under advisement" for the time being. What that meant was not immediately clear, but Thursday morning [11 September] the government is meeting with the government employees' labor unions to see what can be done without hurting the treasury. In that way the promise set forth in the coalition agreement, that is, that such measures would be preceded by discussion with the social partners, is once again being honored.

Permission and Obligation

Van Miert's protest against the inordinate increase in Defense Minister Poswick's budget, too, quickly became negotiable, particularly because it soon became apparent that certain figures in the budget legislation here really were rather overhastily put down on paper. As is well known, Charles Poswick stated everywhere in the weeks that preceded the budget discussions in the cabinet that he demanded a budget increase of 10 percent or he would resign. Presumably to his own, considerable amazement, Poswick got very nearly what he asked for, 9.3 percent, or an

increase of nearly 2 percent more than the other departments, which increased by 7.6 percent: 6.5 percent for inflation and 1.1 percent increase in the gross national product. Poswick got more first and foremost because the army must be able to meet its NATO requirements, but also to compensate for a 1.50 [Belgian] franc increase in the price of diesel oil in favor of the treasury. For that, 750 million francs were allocated in the budget, and that proved to be far too much after calculations. After all, the army fills up for the most part in the Federal Republic, where it does not have to pay the price increase, and the navy often obtains its fuel in foreign harbors, while the air force naturally does not fly on diesel oil. Depending on the figures used, the increase in the BTW [Value Added Tax] tab for diesel oil will turn out to cost the army only about 50 to 60 million francs, or about 700 million less than was provided for in the budget, a figure which naturally not even the liberals in the cabinet could get around immediately.

In contrast to the outcry from some French-speaking liberal and PSC dignitaries, PVV [(Flemish) Party of Liberty and Progress] chairman Willy De Clercq reacted remarkably restrainedly to the situation. If new figures showed that defense had received too much, so he said last Sunday, the budget of that department would just have to be reduced. And as long as the general goals of the budget were not affected by it, he also declared himself willing to talk about the 2 percent assessment on the pay of government employees again. In that way, De Clercq has already relaxed a nervous climate a little. PSC chairman Paul Vanden Boeynants, for his part, was able to say on camera for RTBF [Radio and Television of French-speaking Belgium] that a budget contains nothing more than a permission to pay out a certain amount, but not an obligation to do it, and with those data the nuclear cabinet was able to get into the fight last Monday to try to save the furniture. The last two points that Van Miert raised are more difficult, because here the SP chairman stands even more alone, if possible. As far as Zaire is concerned, history shows that he cannot count on all that much support from his Walloon socialist partner, while Poswick has to explain, if necessary with a great deal of bother, that he had raised the military support to that country, which--as the minister very well knows--his socialist coalition partner cannot have. The behavior of the minister of defense in this matter must at the very least be characterized as unfair, and certainly not of a kind to improve the atmosphere in this government, which the PRL [(Walloon) Party of Liberty and Reform] itself constantly repeats is so important to the country.

As far as the nuclear rockets are concerned, the coalition against Van Miert is even greater if possible. And it is particularly on this point that things can become troublesome for the government. In view of the foregoing, and remembering the fact that the problems raised by the SP are being treated as a package, it may very well be that the chairman of that party will be forced to make concessions precisely on this point which is so very sensitive to him. It seems unlikely that he will be ready to do very much talking because he already accepted a compromise last year in this area. In a talk with the editors which is first reported

here, Van Miert left no doubt remaining that he is not planning to keep on letting his feelings be abused. On 5 October, after all, his party is having a congress, in which the work of the government can be brought up.

How are things going to go? Last Sunday no one seemed willing yet just to give up the coalition. But in the meantime here and there you can hear voices saying that the Brussels part of the constitutional reform is not all that urgent, and can just as well wait a while for a solution. And in that case, the two-thirds majority naturally is not so necessary. The question then is who is going to be hurt, Van Miert or Willy De Clercq, for without the constitutional reform as a prop behind the door, it does not seem likely that the tripartite coalition will be able to survive very long.

Furthermore, another life-sized problem is looming on the horizon, that of knowing what to do about the little school in Komen if 16 children are not sitting at their desks there on 30 September. Not until that headland, too, has been rounded can the work the government has listed on its agenda for this fall, such as social security reform, among other things, be begun.

6940

CSO: 8114/0009

FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE'S DUTIES IN FRG OUTLINED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 80 p 10

[Text] His main task is collaboration in arms questions--and one notices that this has become an obligation to him. Cooperation in questions of armament is a lot of work, especially in recent times--but since the cooperation has already paid off handsomely, since politicians are getting involved, both making demands but also lending support, and since the experts involved have known each other well for years, it is also a source of pleasure and satisfaction for Col Bernard Retat, Ingenieur en chef de l'armement and chief of Mission Technique en FAR, i.e., French military attache in the FRG. He and his family have been here in Germany exactly 2 years. He likes it very much, has much contact with the Germans, even outside of his official duties. He had learned German in school, just as his 4 children (ages 16, 15, 12 and 8), whom he sent to German schools immediately in 1978, although they knew no German. He was born in 1939 in North Africa--his father was stationed there as physician in the military. After basic training and 2 years at the Ecole Polytechnique, which had been founded by Napoleon, he spent 1 year in Algeria as communications officer. From 1962 to 1964 he attended the Ecole Nationale de Telecommunication. He then worked as an official in the technical government service in the development of communication facilities and in the simulation sector for, among other things, the ROLAND, and in 1973 became deputy military attache at the Mission Technique in Washington with the specialties army and missiles.

Now Retat is head of an office with 34 people working under him, under the French Ministry of Defense and affiliated with the embassy. He has three deputies: Chief Engineer Normand for the air force, Chief Engineer Leduc for the army, and Engineer Prevot for navy and electrotechnology. They are always present when the appropriate meetings are taking place in Germany, they are a kind of information bureau for German officials, they mediate, explain, help. And Col Retat is present at the negotiation table at high-level meetings. He is proud of the fact that Mission Technique is so well integrated into the talks and negotiations, and that is in part his accomplishment. Because only in this way can he himself in turn give information--to the ambassador, the French defense attache, and also his

experts in Paris. For them he is a kind of spokesman of the Germans--why is this and that in Germany this way and not some other way, have the Germans been misunderstood, etc. He wishes--and in this he sees his mission in Paris, to explain to the French, in French, the German way of thinking and acting.

What is the main point of emphasis at this time? Combat tank 90 of course. If it should come to a joint development in this case, this would be much much more important than, for example, in the case of planes or rockets. A tank is simply always "the" weapon of the army. And if the project should fail--it would be of great personal concern to Col Retat--"what else should I do here then?" But in addition there are PAH-2, ALPHA-Jet (potential U.S. business) and TKF, which cause a lot of work at present. He calls the tank an example for the fact that in future the bilateral cooperation will turn into a multilateral cooperation--"but the more partners there are, the more difficult it will be."

The second major task of Mission Technique is the purchase of machine tools, measuring instruments, spare parts, cleaning machines etc. for the government arms works and the French forces--approximately DM 100,000 per day are spent for this in Germany. And the third mission: support of French defense officials during their numerous visits to Germany.

There are also numerous visits to German firms and officials by French industrialists, and Mission Technique must in each case issue the necessary security vouchers. In short, the large field of bilateral arms relations on the government level as well as the industrial level constitutes Bernard Retat's job. He is making the effort to increase the mutual trust, the cooperation and the mutual dependency with its political consequences.

9328

CSO: 3103

MILITARY SERVICE REGULATIONS PUBLISHED

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 24 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] 1. Military Service Law 14/1980 published in the Official Gazette (61;13 May 1980) and the 1980 Military Service Regulation published in the Official Gazette (63;14 May 1980) have gone into effect.

2. In accordance with the law, it is incumbent upon all individuals who are citizens of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to perform the duty of military service.

3. In accordance with the Council of Ministers Decision C-559-80 of 8 August 1980, the period of active military service for those TFSC male citizens born in 1950 or later and who will perform their duty in accordance with the Military Service Law is 24 months. The period of active military service for reserve officers who will perform their duty in accordance with the Reserve Officer Law is 22 months. The period of military service for conscript noncommissioned officers who successfully complete the reserve officer training course is 17 months, 18 days; the period of service for those who do not successfully complete the course is 24 months.

4. In accordance with the law, those born in 1949 and prior and who are obligated to military service but did not perform it are to be conscripted and given one month of basic training. They are then to be released from service. However, unless these conscripts complete the full period of time stipulated for active duty, dating from the start of basic training, they will not be given an honorable discharge. They can be called into active duty at any time during this period.

5. In accordance with Article 16 of the 1980 Military Service Regulation, all processing related to final examinations for senior-level students in secondary and equivalent schools is to be performed. Induction letters are to be sent those suitable for military service. The departure date is to be stipulated in the induction letter as the second-term departure date for that year.

Those to be inducted who are eligible for a reserve officer commission but who are certified by official document as eligible for advanced education are granted a one-year deferment.

Therefore, those obligated to service who have graduated secondary or equivalent schools in 1980 as well as those eligible for a reserve officer commission who graduated previously but who cannot certify by official document that they are eligible for advanced education are obligated to complete their military service processing by reporting everyday to the Security Forces Structure and Mobilization Branch so as to be inducted with the November call-up.

Reporting dates are given below according to the district where those obligated reside:

Those residing in Lefkose (Nicosia) district: 29 Sep-6 Oct 1980
Those residing in Magosa (Panagusta) district: 7 Oct-12 Oct 1980
Those residing in Girne (Kyrenia) district: 13 Oct-15 Oct 1980

6. Conscripts whose processing is complete will be subject to departure on 3 November 1980. Conscripts will report to the Security Forces Structure and Mobilization Branch between the dates given in paragraph 5 with the following documents:

- A. TFSC Identity Card
- B. Birth Certificate
- C. Duplicate of photocopy of diploma from school where graduated
- D. For trades, certificate of service from official or private associations for whom the individual actually worked which indicates years of service in that trade and proficiency level
- E. Driver's licence if possessing one
- F. If a sportsman, document from the club to which he belongs

7. Those concerned are to be urgently apprised of the fact that legal proceedings will be initiated for the purpose of levying criminal penalties against conscripts who, without having a legal excuse, have not completed their military processing between the dates of 29 September and 15 October 1980 and who have not reported for the November call-up and that those arrested will be put under arms immediately.

CSO: 4907

GREEK-CYPRIOE EMBARGO OUTLINED, TFSC POSITION GIVEN

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 24 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] It is reported that during the intercommunal talks to continue at the Ledra Palace Hotel today the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus will ask for an end to the economic and political embargo implemented by the Greek-Cypriots since 1963. According to information received by an Anatolia News Agency reported from a TFSC source, the written views of the Turkish side will be presented to the Greek-Cypriots today.

The third session of the new round of intercommunal talks aimed at finding a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem will begin today. The talks will be conducted within the framework of Article Six of the Denktas-Kyprianou Agreement regarding the practical measures needed to ensure the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust between the two Cypriot communities and a return to normalcy.

In the talks today, Turkish negotiator Umit Onar will make clear the negative effect the political and economic Greek-Cypriot embargo has had on the Turkish community over the years, and that the Turkish community should benefit equally from foreign aid sent to Cyprus.

The Greek-Cypriot Administration had been implementing an embargo in every area on and off the island, including sports. The Greek-Cypriots are undermining the economy of northern Cyprus in every way, including commerce and tourism; they are not providing the Turkish community with its share of foreign aid sent to Cyprus - international institutions; they are blocking the implementation of EC projects in northern Cyprus; they declare air and marine ports in the TFSC off limits; and they prevent the transit of foreigners from the south to the north. The Greek-Cypriot Administration, which characterizes the TFSC as an "occupied region," harasses with aircraft that overfly its territory via the FIR (Flight Information Region) line; it arrests and jails the captains of foreign vessels that enter TFSC ports; it prevents the marketing of TFSC goods and hinders tourism; it continually deprecates the TFSC.

It is reported that Umit Onar will again ask for an end to all these Greek-Cypriot actions and assert that positive steps be taken toward implementing Article Six of the Denktas-Kyprianou Agreement.

CSO: 4907

HOW NATION'S INTERESTS IN AFRICA ARE PROTECTED

Bonn DIE WELT in German 10 Sep 80 p 9

[Article by Bernard Edinger: "Giscard's Mobile Organized Bodies of 100 Men"]

[Text] Even though France's colonial empire ceased to exist 20 years ago the Paris Government's interest in its former possessions is as strong as ever. The key word is raw material supply. A recent series of warnings voiced by military and political experts about the possibility of hitherto unimagined upheavals in the Third World during the eighties has lent new importance to France's foreign intervention troops, the "Forces d'action exterieures." In accordance with a specially designed expansion program France's overseas intervention force is the third largest in the world after the United States and the USSR.

So far, Africa's policemen or "Giscard's organized bodies of hundred men," as the troops are called, have already intervened a dozen times whenever France's interests were at stake--which are also the West's interests in almost all cases. Still in vivid memory is the intervention of the Foreign Legion in Zaïre 2 years ago, when communist rebels from Angola penetrated into the Shaba copper province. Within the last year French troops deposed at least one head of state in the then Central African Empire who became burdensome to Paris.

In several African states, in Senegal, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Chad and in Central Africa, which has again become a republic, French soldiers on the spot are ready to prevent the frequently tremendous raw material deposits from falling into the wrong hands.

Recently a whole series of interviews with experts clarified the objectives and action potential of the intervention troops. Retired four-star General D. George Buis, who helped draft France's global strategy for the seventies, was most outspoken: "Indeed, all kinds of political and economic forces are at work both in North and West Africa, not to mention the Near East and the Gulf region, which spell provocation and conflict for the West and especially for France."

He expressly pointed to Tunisia as a potential trouble spot. There France has already decided to keep the pro-Western President Habib Bourguiba in power, "even though he was unpopular at home." In the spring France made means of transportation available to the Tunisian army to repel rebels who allegedly have infiltrated from Libya.

Ruis cited the claims made by Bourguiba and Senegalese President Leopold Senghor accusing Libya of designs not only on Tunisia but on all Francophile states along the Sahel belt. The ex-general also accused Libya of harboring on its territory rebel bands from these countries. That this is true was confirmed by the civil war in Chad.

Only this year the most effective striking force forming part of the "Forces d'action exterieures" was concentrated in Frejus, southwest of Cannes. It can take off at any time from the nearby ports to what diplomats call "the battlefield in Africa" and the Mediterranean basin. The brigade, whose strength is estimated at 3,500 men, is equipped for desert warfare. The 15-ton special tanks, type AMX 10 EC, carry an armor-piercing 105 mm cannon with a range of up to 2,000 meters.

Of course, France is not yet in a position to transport a formation with such heavy equipment by air, a fact which the general staff accepts with resignation.

Aside from the tank brigade at Frejus and the paratroopers in the south of France and in Corsica a 4,000 to 5,000-men strong amphibian unit stands ready in Brittany equipped with light AML-type tanks and 105 mm cannon. All battle-ready units spend alternately at least 4 months a year at France's overseas bases--from Reunion in the Indian Ocean to Tahiti in the Pacific.

Almost 7,000 additional men are stationed in French-speaking Africa and more than 10,000 troops in French possessions in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Another almost 8,000 soldiers are in the West Indies in the Caribbean and in French Guyana.

8664

CSO: 3103

BUSINESS, INDUSTRY AWAIT FRANC DEVALUATION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
6 Sep 80 p 6

[Article by Karl Jetter: "The Bitter Lesson of the Hard Franc"]

[Text] Paris, 5 September--Up to February 1978 the French franc was soft to the melting point. But since then it has been hard, hard as a rock. In these days it has been entitled the "cornerstone" of the French economy.

Prime Minister Raymond Barre has spoken in words that have a steely sound in the ears of French industrialists: "The franc is no longer to be adapted to the (inflationary) desires of the businessmen. On the contrary, it is necessary that the businessmen adapt their behavior to the stability of the franc." The head of the government then put it even more bluntly: "I shall use all necessary means to defend the franc. I would hope that this is sufficiently clear to all those harboring certain hopes in this matter. I am afraid that these hopes will not be fulfilled."

Countless French entrepreneurs, hoping for months for a devaluation of the franc, are astonished: "How long does Mr Barre plan to govern against the realities, against common sense?" And it is recalled that other politicians before him, ranging from de Gaulle to the finance ministers Giscard d'Estaing and Pourcade, rejected devaluations of the franc, only to do it a short while later in the interest of the fatherland.

Things seem to be different now. Nobody is really inclined to underestimate the determination of Raymond Barre as a factor of economic policy. It is a fact that in earlier times conditions similar to those today had already resulted in a wild speculation with the franc. But now the economy is counting on the continuing firmness of the French currency on the money exchanges. And this is thought to last up to the presidential elections next spring.

According to the view of the French businessmen's association "a policy of currency manipulations is not the way to secure the development and security of the French economy." Less officially, the French businessmen are quite

unanimous in the view that a devaluation of the franc would help them to their feet. It could reduce the murderous supply pressure of foreign competition on the French market, further exports, and slow the rise in unemployment. The major economic bulletin AGEFI (Agence Economique et Financiere) thinks that the prime minister's pride in the good standing of the franc is fully justified. "But in certain circles one would rather see a less splendid franc and instead greater export deals, especially with the FRG."

Where, then, has Raymond Barre gone wrong? Apparently, he refuses to concede that his struggle against inflation has been unsuccessful. For example, in the last 2 and 1/2 years prices in Germany have risen by 13 percent, in France, on the other hand, by more than 30 percent. This trend is continuing. By the end of 1982 French products will be 60 percent more expensive than in 1978, German ones only 25 percent. A fixed conversion ratio between the franc and the D-mark will thus result in French bankruptcy in trade with Germany. German exports to France grow at a rate double that of French export growth to Germany (18 percent plus versus 9 percent plus). This year alone the excess of German exports amounted to almost DM 10 billion. For Paris this is primarily an "import of glorified labor": far more than a billion hours of work is contained in the excess export from the FRG alone. The conclusion of the French producers is: "Hard franc means unemployment." No national economist denies that a country with 1.5 million unemployed should have a favorable balance in international trade. But Raymond Barre insists that a devaluation of the franc would accelerate inflation, raise the oil bill, and harm French agriculture. After devaluation France would soon be faced by the old problems, but on an even higher level of inflation. High interest rates and a renunciation of gigantic billion-deficits in the state budget to stimulate business are part of his strategy of the hard franc. This is no Garden of Eden for businessmen! Raymond Barre is a professor of national economy and obviously considers it important and apparently insists that France finally learn "the lesson of the hard franc" by heart, and apply it. Previously, the government always surrendered when the business demanded a devaluation. The arguments were always the same: "Our wages, social costs, and prices have risen to a level that makes it impossible for us to compete. We can no longer invest. We must lay off people." For 4 years Raymond Barre has shown that the businessmen must even risk bankruptcy if they want to rely merely on the devaluation of the franc to make them competitive. No, in the future the businessmen must base their behavior on the discipline of a hard franc, they have to moderate the production costs and wages and thus secure their own existence and future.

Raymond Barre's thoughts contain at least one fallacy. A French plant is required by law to adjust the minimum wage (and the same is true for the majority of wages due to collective contracts) for inflation.

One thing is clear. At current inflation rates the exchange rate of the D-mark and the franc cannot be maintained indefinitely. But this does not necessarily require a devaluation of the franc. The German partner, with fewer unemployed and a better trade balance, can surely be expected to make a contribution to good Franco-German relations. In Paris there will always be understanding for an occasional upward revaluation of the D-mark within the European currency system.

9240

CSO: 3103

LOW INDUSTRY PROFITS REPORTED

Athens ELEVTEROS KOSMOS in Greek 15 Aug 80 p 9

[Text] In recent years, a vertical drop in profits is being noted in Greek industry with a corresponding very low return on private capital--contrary to the noise created recently with the supposed "superprofits" of industries. This, along with the existing economic, social and political climate and various other restraining factors (price controls, insufficient financing, non-existence of a capital market, etc.) has intensified more and more our industry's difficult operating conditions, explain sources from the Association of Greek Industrialists [SEV].

According to related data, in recent years, more than 30 percent of major industry enterprises have operated at a loss and in 1978 (the last year for which there are complete official data), out of 2,520 industries, 947--that is, 37.6 percent--operated at a loss. Furthermore, in the total of 20 industrial branches, six operated regularly at a loss in these years. Deduced from the data cited in the following chart is the serious (at current prices) shrinking of profits which acquires even greater significance if one observes that, on one hand, the number of enterprises has increased in recent years from 1,651 to 2,520 and that, on the other hand, inflation has moved into two figures; likewise the development of the productivity of private capital which barely reached 3.8 percent in 1978 from 13.3 percent in 1974.

Clear Profits and Productivity of Private Capital in the Greek Industry

Year	Number of Enterprises	Gross Profits	Productivity of Private Enterprise (Percent)
1974	1,651	10,807	13.3
1975	1,727	6,006	6.5
1976	1,931	8,611	7.1
1977	2,307	6,707	4.9
1978	2,520	5,735	3.8

Note: The above chart concerns industrial enterprises of the AE [joint stock company] and EPE [limited liability company] form with mechanical equipment worth one million drachmas or more (500 thousand drachmas before 1977) which are characterized in SEV research as "major industry."

It is noted that these allotted profits are taxed (approximately 40 percent) and thus the 100 drachmas of private capital which yielded eight drachmas after taxation in 1974 yielded barely 2.30 drachmas (this inflationary) in 1978, while today 100 drachmas in a savings account yield 13.50 untaxed drachmas and in a term deposit 22 untaxed drachmas.

During the same period, according to the above chart, the increase in the worker's wages covered inflation while the rate of increase in labor productivity was very far from the rate of increase in nominal wages.

Despite the fact that the increase in wages covered inflation, the workers feel compression of their incomes for various reasons, significant among which is increased taxation which emerged from the fact that coefficients of the tax scale remained the same in the period under consideration.

As is verified by the recent OECD report, the returns of enterprises in Greece are at levels lower than other EEC countries and the United States. Therefore, according to OECD, the increase in profits, which at their present level are inadequate, is an essential factor for the recovery of investments which, at the present moment, are not at all sufficient to support the effort for industrialization.

Should the capital gains of an industrial enterprise be strangled by the market profits system existing in Greece, and which exists in the EEC countries, then as it is natural people would prefer to invest in other non-industrial enterprises to avoid risks and difficulties. Long term and composite activities would be necessary and continual technological renewal in order to be able to compete and conquer new markets.

9247

CSO: 4908

CDA'S FABER ON FORMATION OF NEXT COALITION GOVERNMENT

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 22 Aug 80 p 7

[Article by Dr Sytze Faber, an Antirevolutionary Party (ARP) member of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) delegation to the Second Chamber and the deputy chairman of the CDA]

[Text] Last Saturday [16 August 1980], Wim Meijer (member of the PvdA [Labor Party] delegation) pleaded on this page that after the elections his party would have to enter into negotiations to form a coalition on an equal basis with the D'66 [Democrats of 1966] and the CDA. At the request of our editors, Sytze Faber presents a few marginal notes on that idea over his own signature.

The most interesting thing in Meijer's statement is that in his train of thought the prior conditions are obviously on the agenda, and that there must be talk of equality. It was precisely the lack of that equality which contributed to a significant extent to the fact that the months-long attempts to reach a broad coalition of the CDA, D'66 and the PvdA eventually failed. From the beginning, the socialists were intent on bullying the Christian democrats: the new cabinet would of necessity have to be called progressive, the endless tug-of-war about the distribution of the ministerial seats, the disqualification of prominent CDA members when the manning of the ministerial posts was on the agenda, the attempt to station progressive secretaries of state with the Christian democratic ministers as "watch dogs." It can be understood from Meijer's words that at least he is of the opinion that the PvdA must not be guilty of that kind of aggravation and misplaced insistence again in the coming cabinet formation. And I think that Meijer really sincerely believes that this time the PvdA ought to proceed on the principle of the equality of potential coalition partners. Disregarding the possibility of a personal political change of heart on that point, there is also an entirely practical reason for Meijer to break a lance for equality. That is, it is to be expected that the PvdA's position after the coming elections will be clearly different from that which the PvdA assumed after the 1977 elections, and Meijer is simply being reasonable if he tries to anticipate that.

My Own View

In 1977, the PvdA scored a record gain of 10 seats; the socialist delegation became the biggest in the Second Chamber. That rousing success blinded them: they lost sight of the fact that the predominant part of the socialist gains came from the smaller leftist parties. The smaller parties were, as it were, turned out by their socialist big sister. To a not insignificant extent that must be explained by the fact that Den Uyl combined the post of prime minister with that of standard bearer of the PvdA.

Well, now, in the coming elections that will not be the case. To a significant extent, the 1977 gains will flow back to the smaller parties. It must also be remembered that history shows that the PvdA does not do well while it is in the opposition.

In short, it is by all means reasonable to suppose that in the coming elections the PvdA will have to give up a large part of the gains achieved in 1977. And that implies that it is probable that not the PvdA but the CDA will have the largest delegation in the Second Chamber. I will only say that the PvdA may have good reason now to beat the drum of equality.

For that matter, there remains the interesting question of for whom Meijer's remarks were primarily intended. Meijer is not a party leader, but a member of the chamber who is known to be fond of thinking in tactical and strategic categories. Moreover, he has Den Uyl's respect. That much, at least, can be determined from the fact that Den Uyl spoke out at a very early stage in favor of Meijer's candidacy when the fight broke out for the chair of the party chairman. However, Van Den Berg was the winner. And he is known to be scarcely able to give up flirting with the thought of a leftist/progressive majority cabinet.

It is therefore obvious that Meijer's article was primarily intended for internal consumption. With his plea for coalition discussions "on an equal basis" with the CDA and the D'66, Meijer took up a position in opposition to his party colleagues who are inclined to stack the deck for a leftist majority cabinet. In any event, this is a choice that is not devoid of realism. Two figures for the purpose of illustration: In 1972, the four leftist parties (PvdA, PPR [Political Party of the Radicals], PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] and CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands]) together received 38.1 percent of the vote. And in 1977, after "Uncle Joop" had been running the country for about 4 years, these parties together came up with precisely the same percentage. Admittedly, the D'66 were to be included in the leftist camp "for the sake of argument," then the prospects for a leftist majority after the coming elections would still not be the least bit flourishing.

If the PvdA is eager to be a part of the coming cabinet, Meijer's approach offers considerably better prospects than gambling on a leftist majority.

Polarization

For a number of reasons, I hope that the moderate position of Meijer and his associates wins out in the PvdA. I feel it to be very important that a serious attempt is being made in this manner to break through the polarization between "left" and "right," a polarization which has been infecting political relationships in our country for about 10 or 15 years. If it proves time after time that the programs of the socialists and the Christian democrats do not differ so very much on a number of points (and here it may be that I am still expressing myself euphemistically), then it is improper if that is not expressed in the formation of a cabinet.

Our electoral system is based on proportional representation. That implies a broad spectrum of political parties. Therefore it is equally inappropriate in the Dutch situation to sow the seeds of the political dichotomy: "left" vs. "right." That leads to unnecessary extremism, to "homogeneous" cabinets like the Den Uyl cabinet ("red with white border") or to cabinets that lead with a minimal parliamentary majority (as is the case at the moment).

It seems to me to be very important that the CDA, too, not let itself push the simplistic left-right outline. If I have counted right, the Van Agt cabinet is the 15th cabinet since World War II. In the 14 previous cabinets, the 3 [major] denominational parties were all represented 7 times, while the other 7 times either the ARP or the CHU [Christian Historical Union] was in the opposition. Then denominational voters could differ with a party and still vote Christian Democratic. Now that the three parties involved have merged into one stream, that opportunity is denied. But that does not mean that all of a sudden the members of the Christian Democratic movement have started signing in unison. Naturally not and fortunately not. If you look at it from a politicological point of view (or, as far as I am concerned, a tactical point of view) the CDA is now faced with the important question of whether the flexibility which earlier was so characteristic of the Christian democratic center will be able to continue now that the fusion of the three parties is (almost) accomplished. An important part of the (recent) bind the CDA has been in must be explained by the circumstance that the ship of Christian democratic multiplicity has been sailing along the lee shore of the minimal parliamentary majority.

Along with the abovementioned weighty arguments (against polarization, against dichotomy and for normal majority cabinets), to my way of thinking this party political element must still be mentioned: within the foreseeable future don't we still not only have to determine a definitive party platform but also need to look around for a standard bearer? And that brings up the issue of to what extent a coalition cabinet can be the stakes in the election for a party like the CDA.

Aside: Does the equality Meijer is calling for also imply that the largest delegation must necessarily provide the prime minister?

It is not entirely by chance that he did not touch on that prickly point. Good examples produce good behavior, we ought to think, so I will (gladly) avoid that point as well.

Homogeneous Cabinet

I agree with Meijer: the idea often propagandized by the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] of a national cabinet buries within itself the entire range of political and social confrontations and it [such a cabinet] will therefore be unable to make any real decisions and will be unable to break through any impasses. But what about a "homogeneous" national cabinet? A cabinet with a clearly outlined policy program and consisting of ministers coming from parties having more-or-less similar views of the society of the future?

There are just a few loose thoughts and questions that are liable to escape if we think back on the cabinet formations of 1972 and 1979, formations that were the lowpoints of parliamentary history and the highpoints of party-politics-to-the-last-square-millimeter. Don't let that happen a third time (at least during a serious economic malaise). In that respect, the suggestion put forward by Meijer is constructive. And along with that, I personally will not rule out in advance the path of an (extraordinary) homogeneous national cabinet. For what could be done, for example, if the broad coalition proposed by Meijer were to prove to be out of the question because the prominent members of the parties involved excluded one another from participation in a cabinet like that? That is not such an absurd question if you take into account the people who are currently playing major roles on the political stage at The Hague.

6940

CSO: 3105

PVDa'S KOMBRINK COMMENTS ON NEXT COALITION GOVERNMENT

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 30 Aug 80 p 7

[Article by Hans Kombrink, Labor Party (PvdA) Second Chamber member:
"The Question for the PvdA Is With Whom and How"]

[Text] On Saturday, 16 August, Wim Meijer (PvdA delegation member) called on his party comrades to go into the election without preconditions. He did not even preclude a coalition with the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] then.

On 22 August, Sytze Faber (CDA/AR [Anti-Revolutionary Party]) responded to Meijer's article.

He is as little in favor of simplistic left vs. right in Dutch politics as Meijer. Today's statement is by a member of Meijer's party.

Perhaps Wim Meijer was not entirely happy when he read that Sytze Faber understood his article to be "a serious attempt to break through the polarization between left and right." In part he can blame himself for that. The transition from a frontal attack on the Van Agt line to a plea for cooperation with the CDA was too abrupt.

In essence, Meijer calls for a directional struggle within the CDA and it is interesting to note that Faber did not deal directly with that. In the second place, Meijer calls on the PvdA to do nothing that would possibly keep his party and mine from carrying the responsibility of governing. Was his proposition formulated in the proper manner?

Faber begins by raking over dead coals about the 1977 cabinet formation. I fear that the PvdA and that part of the CDA that had wanted to do business with the PvdA will still have reason-to-remember to regret that for a long time to come.

Four-Movement Country

Now that the three-movement country seems to be changing into a four-movement country, the central group is participating eagerly in the development, for that expands its scenario opportunities and, therefore, its power. And that is certainly true when the situation in the three-movement country is in such a state of change that the central party can no longer be sure of a majority for each of the two possible combinations.

That is how I see the relationship between the CDA and the D'66 [democrats of 1966]. It seems certain that this latter party will win seats. It remains to be seen whether it will be as many as the latest opinion polls indicate, but D'66 is unmistakably faced with an important political choice. It can develop into a center party, which will lend its position of power to holding open all possible opportunities for coalitions and exchanges. In that case, its portion will be degeneration, in view of its creation and nearly 15 years' tradition and devotion. And then it will reinforce the CDA's position. Or it can remain what it still is, a sui generis progressive grouping, which strives for a definite policy and also for political clarity. And then it will reinforce the threat to the CDA.

In essence, it depends upon the extent to which a general dichotomy can be brought about in Dutch politics. That two-movement country need not have a two-party system. Each of the two fields of power can be of varied composition and can contain parties with their own function and their own appeal. The path in that direction need not be the right one, and can become stagnated quickly. It can demand a difficult orientation of (and within) political groupings.

It is not true that in the Dutch tradition the entire Christian democratic movement must be incorporated in the right. And to an equally great extent, two Christian democratic political groupings are not unthinkable. It is known that bringing this about is being thought over, by the one group more publicly than by the other. Furthermore, it is not true that a hard course on the part of the PvdA with respect to the CDA furthers the desired division under all circumstances.

Broad Coalition?

It may be true that an attempt to govern together with the CDA again would be more effective. In that way the party may break up, as was the case with the KY? [Catholic People's Party] after 1966, or the internal opposition may increase as was the case after 1977.

Against this background, I still choose the formation of a progressive majority as my principle. Meijer will certainly accept a progressive cabinet gratefully once it has been shown to be the will of the people. For me that is too passive: it may and must be worked for hard.

But it cannot be the only card the PvdA ought to play. My most important reason for that is that not all of the relevant allies (particularly the D'66) want to go along, that the programmatic variation within the alliance to be brought about would be too great now, and that the area of power is (still) too small to dare the leap into the (new) depths.

Meijer's arguments do not appeal very much to me. That the right should simply limit itself to calling: "Block the left!" seems to me to come down to the creation of an artificial confrontation involving the staking of policy against power.

Meijer speaks of a special responsibility deriving from the altered situation. And the close of his article might give the impression (unintentionally?) that he means that the mutual differences between the CDA and the PvdA must be buried and that they must together put their hands to the plow by means of a "Great Coalition."

The responsibility of the CDA majority for the current course (certainly as long as it is not changed to the end and, therefore, is all the more to be fought) cannot be tied as simply as one-two-three to a common new responsibility. Furthermore, we have not gone through the ordeal of reaching a programmatic agreement. The progressive forces will always be subject to stiff resistance on the part of the CDA in carrying out that program. Meijer himself pointed that out. For those reasons, there will always have to be minimum standards for the PvdA as concerns the balance of power.

And for that matter, is participation in a cabinet thinkable for the PvdA without Don Uyl as prime minister? Politicians are replaceable, but a party like the PvdA cannot and must not suddenly give up an identity after the elections in which it has invested deeply and in which it has led the voters to invest. Therefore, I rule out the idea already proposed by Faber (and obviously directed against Mr Van Agt) of an extraparliamentary homogeneous national cabinet in advance. It is intended as an emergency leap out of the difficulties in which the CDA finds itself, and must be dealt with as such.

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CSO: 3105

DEN UYL PLEADS FOR PVDa, D'66, CDA COALITION GOVERNMENT

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 2 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] Utrecht, 2 September--"The PvdA [Labor Party] cannot permit itself to cut off the road to the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal]. A left majority cabinet is not very likely and, therefore, you have to operate on the basis of cooperation with the CDA. It can do no harm to say that calmly and bluntly.

That, short and clear, is PvdA delegation leader Den Uyl's message about his party's new political strategy to get back into the Catshuis [ministerial palace].

According to Den Uyl, invited as guest speaker to a meeting of the D'66 [Democrats of 1966] in Utrecht, the PvdA must make it clear that it is going to govern. Nonparticipation in the government in 1977 shocked countless people. Cooperation with the D'66 is obvious. He said, "I have always seen D'66 as a natural ally."

But, Den Uyl continued, it will not be simple. He said he was shocked by the many differences that a closer inspection showed to exist between the programs of the PvdA and the CDA. The CDA program reeks of shoring up again, of emphasizing the individual denominational organizations. Den Uyl said that was a symptom of ossification. Programmatic cooperation will become very difficult, and he predicted that if the cabinet lasts out its term the support for a change to the PvdA [as coalition partner] within the CDA will not be very great.

In response to a concerned D'66 member in the hall, Den Uyl warned against expecting too much of a new progressive cabinet. The broader the cabinet, the greater the chance for confrontation. In the first Den Uyl cabinet, much of the ambitious legislative program was blocked by opposition from the CDA.

Warning

Den Uyl had a warning up his sleeve for the D'66 itself: The credibility of the D'66 is endangered if the road is kept open for a cabinet with the CDA and the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]. "I understand the D'66 desire to keep on rolling on its successful tour of independence, but I do say: look out that you do not lose your reputation for clarity, with which you started out in politics in 1966."

Den Uyl left himself a lot of time for the socio-economic problems and for the cabinet's policy, which he believes to be doomed to failure. This, too, was worded in political advice for Jan Terlouw's party: Den Uyl said there could be no success in the struggle with unemployment without the PvdA. If you earn something like twice the national average--and here Den Uyl clearly meant to include his audience--it is easy to be philosophical about moderation. At the average income, however, that is very difficult and at the social minimum it is almost impossible.

Someone like Van Agt, who talks rather loosely about reductions for the minimum wage earners, does not understand anything about it, and the D'66, as well, must have a clear understanding of what a reduction means to those people. "They will rebel," Den Uyl predicted.

The people will only be willing to give in if they can see concretely what is being done with their money. Plans must first be presented, such as: in this industry, so many jobs in exchange for giving up so much [money]. If, as a cabinet, you just keep on and on about the social security benefits having to be lowered, you will rouse opposition and you will be faced with a mocking, mistrusting labor movement, so said Den Uyl.

'Prospects'

The discussion leader, Den Uyl's former colleague Gruijters, summed up for the audience: "Without agreeing with Den Uyl in everything, it is clear that he offers hope and prospects of a new approach to the problems. That is not at all possible with the current cabinet."

Thus, there was not harmony on programs but there was political harmony between the two parties at this D'66 evening meeting, which may very well be the beginning of a long election campaign.

6940

CSO: 3105

MINISTER DE GEUS: COUNTRY CANNOT FULFILL NATO OBLIGATIONS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 13 Sep 80 pp 142-143

[Article by Rene de Bok: "Doctoral Candidate Pieter de Geus, New Professional Risk in the Van Agt Cabinet"]

[Text] The American defense minister, Harold Brown, considers the Dutch plan to restrict increased defense expenditures an alarming development. The Pentagon regards the Netherlands as a renegade ally. The man who publicly announced that the Netherlands presumably will not stick to the NATO agreements for a 3 percent real increase is the new minister of defense, doctoral candidate, Pieter de Geus. His predecessors Kruisinga and Schelten left him a not very attractive legacy. An ELSEVIER portrait of the third man in defense follows.

The American government has already had enough of the "disloyal attitude" of some NATO allies. Denmark was the first one to be slapped. In a letter to the Danish government, Defense Minister Harold Brown unequivocally threatened that American assistance to Denmark could no longer be taken for granted, in case of Russian aggression. The reason for the American government's spitefulness was the Danish government's intention to increase its military expenditure only by a token amount. The United States appears to have abandoned its tactical operations in the NATO Alliance—lobbies and exercising mild pressure—for a hard line. In that period of all times, a new minister of defense moves into the offices of the most active ministerial apparatus in the square in The Hague. And his first statement does not beat around the bush: The Netherlands probably will not comply with the agreements made in the NATO Alliance to increase real military

expenditures by 3 percent. Doctoral Candidate Pieter de Geus says in amplification: "The Netherlands will have to point out straightened circumstances to make this clear to NATO."

Meanwhile, the Pentagon showed little understanding for the Netherlands' point of view. The first unofficial reactions expressed great concern about the NATO partner's stability and loyalty. Besides congratulations on his appointment, the new defense minister, De Geus, is scolded for marching out of step in the NATO Alliance. De Geus' position is not enviable. He is caught between two fires, which are stirred up energetically on both sides, the American pressure on one hand, the pressure of the progressive parties in his own country on the other hand. The bellows of the progressive parties are operating at full blast and it will not be easy for De Geus to maneuver unscathed between the two fires.

At first sight, his appointment appeared to amount to a necessary showing of the flag by the cabinet. For how much political importance can be attached to a man who, in the most favorable case, had 9 months to go? His appointment seemed to be of little importance compared with the appointment of his predecessors, Kruisinga and Scholten. When both deserted, whereby Kruisinga's conscience about the neutron bomb faltered and Scholten chose the attractive prospect of the vice-chairmanship of the Council of State over quarreling about the defense apparatus, someone must again be appointed to the position. The way in which Prime Minister Van Agt explained the final choice of De Geus, indicated that the appointment was no more than a necessity.

Defense of policy sometimes confronts a highly placed official with the most serious problems, witness the appearance of the recognized "professional risk," Chris van der Klaauw as minister of foreign affairs in the Van Agt cabinet. A political find at defense, such was the prevailing opinion in The Hague politics, was the most available solution. Shortly before the appointment, CHU [Christian Historical Union] chairman, Van Leeuwen, proposed three members of parliament, CHU leader in the Second Chamber, doctoral candidate, Gerard van Leijenhorst, doctor of laws, Klaas de Vries and Senator Prof Van Hulst. The long delay in the selection of a new defense minister was an indication that higher interests were involved than filling a position as third man of defense. Lubbers especially played a key role, in which the future coalition conversations between christian democrats, democrats and socialists came to the forefront. Van Leijenhorst was a complication. The appointment of the CHU leader as minister of

defense could cast a shadow beforehand on the future formation discussions. The possibility that Van Leijenhorst consequently would demand the defense portfolio was not unrealistic. In view of his conservative policy, that would again create the necessary problems with the Socialists, who also had the Stemerink candidacy in reserve.

"De Geus," so Van Agt said, "is the best informed. He knows precisely what is going on in defense." This statement is no more than a feint to conceal the real motives behind the De Geus appointment with a cloak of platitudes. De Geus is described in CHU circles as an ambitious official. His background gives him a broad view in the field of military affairs. After secondary school he was trained as a naval officer, in which service he held various posts at sea and ashore. In 1968 he obtained his doctoral candidate degree in business economics at the NEH [Netherlands College of Economy] in Rotterdam. Until recently, he was director general for economics and finance at defense. Politically, De Geus was again such an unknown factor. His activities in this field: he was a member of the Rhine Mouth Council for 10 years, member of the CHU Executive Committee, of the CHU Defense Committee and CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] group chairman in Maassluis. He has no background with which—even as an ambitious official—to rapidly rise to a top position of political responsibility. Consequently his selection was somewhat surprising for outsiders. There is an unmistakable preference for appointing politicians instead of officials to the highest position. The recent experiences with officials, appointed as ministers, are not always encouraging.

Van Agt himself felt little appeal for figures such as Prof Van Hulst and Doctor of Laws Klaas de Vries, labeled rightists. Van Agt faced two problems. On the one hand, he wanted to continue the consistent line of Scholten policy, on the other hand he definitely needed a less rigid, more flexible personality, whom progressive circles would not immediately consign to the political scrap heap as a conservative. Van Agt preferred an unknown quantity to hold the politically easily flammable post of minister of defense, without such friction from right or left. Lubbers provided such an unknown quantity, made to measure. De Geus' name was mentioned once before in the 1977 formation; then, however, he was dropped because his different view of defense policy did not fit in with the rigid position which Kruisinga especially displayed in cabinet formation. De Geus is receptive to any argument or initiative. For years he published articles in party newspapers, but also outside, in which he expressed his different

approach. Some CHU members consider De Geus' ideas radical. However, De Geus is the opposite of a revolutionary innovator. As a financial expert, he emphasizes moderation.

In his concern to make both ends meet, he concentrates his military vision on a conventional preparedness and he keeps his distance from high flown nuclear ambitions. He does not like to take an isolated point of view, as Scholten did several times. On the subject of stationing nuclear missiles, De Geus' ideas are in line with those of the cabinet. De Geus does not favor rejecting the stationing of nuclear missiles in Dutch territory, if the Netherlands alone supports that position. De Geus says: "I have the same point of view about the modernization of nuclear weapons as Minister Scholten. There is no difference there." Even here the new minister shows flexibility. For when former defense minister Stemer-dink in a reaction to the appointment of De Geus declared he expected that De Geus, in the preparation of the nuclear weapons decision at the end of 1981, would follow a policy favoring the introduction and stationing of missiles in the Netherlands, De Geus called that statement "premature." With the appointment of De Geus as minister of defense, CDA group leader Lubbers gambled on the sympathy which De Geus would arouse in the dissident section of his own group and in the progressive camp.

The fact that De Geus' position is still highly important will appear in the development of the problems connected with nuclear weapons. The question is still acute in parliament. Thus autumn negotiations are being conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union about nuclear weapons with medium distance missiles, in which the unusual situation appears that the NATO partner, the Netherlands, still expresses a different point of view in the Atlantic discussion. The decisions which a subsequent cabinet will make about the stationing of the disputed missiles, are now being prepared under De Geus' leadership. And in that preparation, the inevitability of a blue print for many years will be decided. A better understanding between Minister of Defense De Geus, as the pawn of the Van Agt cabinet on one hand and the dissident CDA section and the progressive parties on the other hand, can have political results whose aftereffects will extend far into the eighties.

From the domestic political point of view, De Geus' appointment seems to serve a dual CDA strategy: extending a hand to the progressive forces and demolishing a future Stemer-dink

ministry. In a broader context, it does not appear out of the question that De Geus, through his openness and flexibility, will create the conditions for a fight in which the Netherlands' role in NATO becomes a subject for discussion. If the less experienced official, De Geus, does not develop at breakneck speed into a political acrobat, the risk of a new professional misfortune in the Van Agt cabinet does not appear conceivable. And then Lubbers will lose his poker game with the third man at defense later.

8490

CSO: 3105

SOARES CARNEIRO CANDIDACY, AD ELECTORAL STRATEGIES

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 12 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Carneiro Jacinto and Pedro Cid: "Who Will Have 'Command' of the Right"]

[Text] Judging from some evidence gathered by O JORNAL, there would appear to be a certain amount of dissatisfaction within the AD [Democratic Alliance] with the way in which the launching of its presidential candidate, Gen Soares Carneiro, was carried out; something which could lead to some significant changes in the top-ranking leadership of the campaign during the next few weeks.

In this connection, an AD official dealing particularly with electoral problems told us: "To date, we have given some backing, not much, to the launching, but the fact is that we do not understand the reasons which prompted Soares Carneiro to opt for his type of campaign, nor the principles underlying the strategy that is to be pursued."

Another leader, close to Largo do Caldas, reasoned in the same manner, and spoke in terms of the political council of the general of the commands. He added that there seems to be an intentional inertia which has caused Soares Carneiro to walk on his own feet, at his own desire and risk.

Cunha Rego's Plans Postponed

Moreover, contingencies of various kinds have curtailed the action of the general's political council itself, and this is why a certain amount of importance has been attached to the meeting held the day before yesterday (Wednesday, 10 September) by nearly all the members of that political group (with the exception of Carlos Macedo and Lucas Pires, who are on leave abroad).

Mota Pinto and Cunha Rego attended, and the latter explained some of the most important aspects of the strategy (the marketing, to use a term mentioned by one of the participants) for the campaign.

O JORNAL was given assurance that the plans of Vitor da Cunha Rego will, however, be subjected to another detailed analysis later on.

So, the general will continue somewhat along the path that he has been treading, with luncheons and dinners, in a campaign that is moderately elite, well fed and well provided with drink.... What could change a little is the less elegant language that has typified Soares Carneiro.

It was also decided that the campaign would undergo a certain amount of softening, because priority must be given to the electoral campaign for the Assembly of the Republic.

In fact, those responsible for the AD's electoral machine were of the opinion that the references to Soares Carneiro, as noted in the "campaign handbook," should not go beyond the mere affirmation that the coalition cannot attempt to have a majority and a president in harmony. Indirectly, the criticism of Eanes will be only a result of this option.

The Picture and a Commentary

Soares Carneiro, whose picture in civilian clothes appeared this week disseminated along some streets in Lisbon (see article in O JORNAL DO DIA), and whom television granted 5 minutes to comment on Ramalho Eanes' speech, while he was participating in a luncheon at Caldas da Rainha, thus appears to be acting virtually at his own desire and risk. For example, we were told that the type of picture that appeared on the advertising "placards" was not based on any particular reason (when questioned about this by members of the AD apparatus, one of the "free-lancers" for the candidacy remarked: "It appeared to us to be a turnabout").

On the other hand, there was considerable comment on the insipid and defensive way in which Soares Carneiro discussed Eanes' speech on his second candidacy, wherein he mentioned the Communists in every line, and added little more.

It is also important to cite the visible apprehension of the political analysts close to AD and of those whose position is on the extreme right of the party gamut (examples in the recent "Political Analysis" by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa in EXPRESSO, and in Thursday's edition of A RUA), regarding a crisis perceived in the most deepseated relations between the candidate general and the coalition which wants to catapult him to Belem. In other words, the entire strategic-political movement of late has been aimed far more toward "checkmating" Eanes than being concerned with proving that Soares Carneiro's political capacity of itself can defeat President Eanes at the polls. To put it differently and more simply: The scenario in which the AD strategists appear to be acting is one which has as established facts the victory of the Alliance in the legislative elections (although by a close margin) and the reelection of Ramalho Eanes. And this point inevitably downgrades the candidacy of Soares Carneiro to such an extent that a foreign element might be revealed in the political dynamics after the legislative election.

A Leadership Problem?

For all these reasons, the AD's most efficient strategists think that something will have to change, and an indication of what we have mentioned may have been given in the communique released yesterday, Thursday, by Soares Carneiro's political council, wherein, although the "Communist" issue is largely in evidence again, the PS' love affair with the matter of constitutional revision is resumed.

However, this apparent impasse in launching the Soares Carneiro candidacy does not appear to be completely displeasing to certain officials of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]. In the realm of hypotheses, there are some who are beginning to speculate that there may be taking shape among certain spirits the conviction that there is a "need" to "trade" Sa Carneiro for Soares Carneiro in the leadership of the right wing bloc, for reasons which, among other aspects, relate to the family status of the current prime minister.

The Problem of the Constitutional Revision

An obvious indication of this state of affairs may have been the positions assumed by all sides in facing the issue of the constitutional revision. While Santana Lopez (PSD [Social Democratic Party]), on behalf of Sa Carneiro, prepared a proposal removing nearly all the important powers from the president of the republic, Cruz Vilaca, and later Freitas do Amaral himself, opted for a solution more in keeping with the interests of Soares Carneiro, in the event that he were elected. In this respect, the general of the commands scored some points in comparison with Sa Carneiro.

Certain Social Democratic sources also told O JORNAL that Soares Carneiro's "entourage" was filled with followers of the CDS, unknown individuals without any idea of how an image of a candidate for the presidency of the republic should be "constructed."

Does Soares Carneiro Depend on the AD's Victory?

The final topic is associated with the possibility that AD may "drop" its candidate in the event that it does not win in the forthcoming legislative elections. A qualified member of AD told us, in this regard, that, if AD loses power, the support for Soares Carneiro may be reconsidered; because, in such an event, the present coalition in power could opt to focus its attention on the problems of the constitutional revision. But this official also thought that, in the opposite contingency (an AD victory), Ramalho Eanes would encounter great difficulty in winning his contest with Soares Carneiro.

Be that as it may, the large majority of prominent personages in AD contacted for this purpose by O JORNAL let it be known that not everything is going well in the process of Soares Carneiro's candidacy. The next few weeks may

clarify some positions, specifically, as we have already noted, with respect to the leadership of Soares Carneiro's campaign.

Valente de Oliveira and Artur Santos Silva: New Support

Finally, O JORNAL learned that Valente de Oliveira, minister of education in the Mota Pinto government, and Artur Santos Silva, former secretary of state for finance and a banking administrator, may be among the signers of a manifesto from personages in the north supporting the candidacy of Soares Carneiro, which is due to be released very soon. These and other names of individuals who, it is predicted, will become members of the national commission to back the candidacy, may be divulged during the next few weeks.

2909

CSO: 3101

PERSPECTIVES ON EANES' PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Analysis of Election Prospects

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Sep 80 p 13

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "Eanes: A Mistake as a Candidate or a Candidate of Mistakes?"]

[Excerpt] 2. The Candidate of the Center and of Dialog?

On this basis, it behooves us to assess, albeit briefly, the nature of Antonio Ramalho Eanes' second candidacy for the post that he has held for the past 4 years, and what it represents.

This task has become more complicated inasmuch as virtually all the analysts who have written on the subject do not conceal their personal preferences as citizens. Some have already signed and delivered an intellectuals' manifesto backing Ramalho Eanes. Even though they are not panegyrists, it is naturally difficult for them to make value judgments highly unfavorable to their candidate. Others signed the letter sent at a certain juncture to Soares Carneiro, asking him to run as a candidate. It is only natural for them not to take advantage of all occasions to underscore the merits of the Eanes candidacy, and even to stress his lack of merit, although this entails a certain amount of voluntarism that has been sharply criticized in the past.

Now the truth demands that it be stated that two opposing portrayals have been made of Eanes as a candidate for the second time, both of which are suggestive, but neither actually correct.

According to his followers, Eanes' second candidacy is an independent, national candidacy backed by a central bloc which is not confined to the PS (Socialist Party), but which rather includes more variegated sectors of the independent left, the left-center and even the center. At the same time, Eanes appears as a "civilian-oriented" candidate, in line with his 1976 candidacy, now opposed by many who supported him then, through their own fault or as a result of their strategic or tactical ideological conversions.

It is claimed that Eanes is still the strategic-political center, and the guarantee that the Portuguese people will not become divided; whereas those now attacking him have revealed abundantly throughout the past 4 years a dangerous temptation toward the right, which is bipolarizing, if not destabilizing to the democratic institutions as well.

As for the risks of support from the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], it is added, they stem from a Manichean invention of the right wing, which is always ready to confuse those who do not adhere to it with communist-influenced radical options.

These are, and will continue to be, the major topics related to the general political grounds for Antonio Ramalho Eanes' second candidacy.

1. A Mistake as a Candidate?

In the view of the AD [Democratic Alliance], Ramalho Eanes' second candidacy is met with clearcut opposition, which we could summarize in this statement: Eanes is a mistake as a candidate, and therefore he is necessarily doomed to defeat.

For many months, Eanes was a mistake as a candidate, because he did not even run as a candidate.

As recently as a few weeks ago, we heard many good, responsible members of the AD claim unhesitatingly that Eanes would not run again as a candidate. And the reasons which they gave were countless: the lack of agreement with the PS, the absence of backing from the military sectors, the launching of the Soares Carneiro candidacy, the inevitable decline in the president's prestige resulting from his clash with the executive branch, and the growing political affirmation of the government and its prime minister.

Later, when it became evident that Eanes was advancing, the analysis became different. The chances of success available to him were said to be reduced, in the first place, because he appeared as a national, independent candidate, backed only by the PS and a group of Socialist "fellow travelers." Secondly, he would need the PCP's votes, and that would suffice, at the very outset, to hurt his candidacy.

Thirdly, the lack of military support would deprive the second candidacy of political credibility and public backing.

Finally, the manner of its launching, the confused, opaque and even compromising style of his remarks, and the old age and slight representative status of his backers: all this quickly pointed to a negative result for Eanes' ambitions.

Not to mention a possible AD victory in the legislative elections, which of itself would be capable of creating matchless dynamics for defeating a presidential candidate backed by a political force that had just been soundly beaten in the parliamentary elections.

For all these reasons, the AD analysts believe that Eanes' defeat is as sure as 2 and 2 equalling 4. They evince the same certainty with which the analysts supporting Eanes do not doubt his victory for even a second.

According to the latter, his candidacy is a kind of candidacy of the regime, reminiscent of the old Mexican dream that the PS never managed to fulfill in Sao Bento, and that could come true now with a headquarters in Belem. For this reason, they are united in a holy alliance against the specter of reaction that is advancing.

According to the former, Eanes represents a mistake as a candidate, incapable of taking a stand and of convincing the majority of the Portuguese people, and inexorably subject to a left wing "popular front," an obstacle that must be removed so that the Portuguese right wing may govern for a long period of time in the French or Greek fashion; which is tantamount to saying that it could be in power under democracy in our country for many years, if not a decade.

4. The Candidate of Mistakes

Now, with all due respect, we disagree with both of these two views of Antonio Ramalho Eanes' candidacy.

We disagree with the first one because that candidacy is actually based upon a series of undeniable political mistakes.

It is a candidacy which wants to be a reflection of the civilian society, but which represents the most outworn, artificial type of construction, starting from power toward the civilian society. It is a candidacy which attempts not to benefit from the special conditions that the present position affords the candidate, but which was planned and launched on the basis of that position and on the facilities to which the latter affords access. It is a candidacy which has been affirmed independently, but which progressed only after a prior agreement with the PS, and before the legislative elections, so that the FRS [Republican Socialist Front] could gain an electoral advantage from its launching. It is a candidacy which repudiates any political commitment to the PCP, but which has benefited from the unusual phenomenon of the PCP's silence, 2 and a half months before the presidential elections, on the matter of introducing its own candidate for them. In addition to the silence, the PCP has explained that it intends to wait for the results of 5 October, in order to be able to gage the correlation of forces, so as to know when it should turn over its votes to the candidate Eanes; because the end goal of considering Eanes' reelection positive, in this context, now appears strategically unquestionable to the PCP.

It is a fact that, throughout Portuguese political history, many have benefited from the backing or the good will of the PCP, even without obvious

commitments to it. However, it would be worthwhile to observe, case by case, the reason for that backing or good will, and also the price paid before, during or after its manifestation.

Finally, it cannot be said that Eanes' political activity during the past 4 years, although unquestionably skillful, has always been straightforward and consistent. Pardon us for recalling here some widely varying phases wherein many of his present backers went to far as to question the constitutionality and even the political integrity, of the president's conduct.

In brief, Eanes' candidacy is, in fact, a candidacy based upon a great many political mistakes.

However (and it is here that we disagree with several zealous AD analysts), there is a substantial difference between being a candidate based on political mistakes and being a mistake as a candidate.

The fact is that if Eanes were a mistake as a candidate, he would have been defeated by now. Being the candidate of mistakes, on this occasion he appears likely to have victory exceeding that of the AD candidate.

First of all, contrary to what many guaranteed, Eanes ended up running as a candidate despite the launching, 2 and a half months earlier, of a candidate who was said to have been acclaimed for the purpose of causing him to withdraw.

Moreover, there was a certain amount of over-assessment in government circles of the political influence that the government and the prime minister would achieve on the national scene, merely because they had that status.

There were some who thought that Sa Carneiro had been launched in such a way that Eanes would not withstand his political ascent.

There are even some who claim (perhaps with reason) that the AD has very powerful trumps available, owing to the mere fact that it is the government in a country wherein one could count on the fingers of one hand the instances in which the government lost the elections.

But those commentators forget that the same thing applies to the president of the republic: he is also in a particularly strong position to consider the possibility of reelection with some degree of optimism. And the experience in other countries where universal suffrage is practiced, albeit indirectly, in the election of the head of state, proves the difficulties facing any candidate who opposes the one already holding the office and running as candidate for the second time.

In the United States, there has never been an elected president who ran for reelection and did not win.

It should be added that Eanes' second candidacy is based on mistakes, but that it is attempting to take electoral advantage of those mistakes. Observe the text of the speech on the second candidacy, which may have been confused, ambiguous and compromising in the view of certain political analysts from the AD area, but which had in its content as well as in its form all the necessary qualities for taking advantage of the mistakes that lie at the base of the candidacy, without the public as a whole having noticed this. It is the vote of the ordinary citizen that Eanes wants to gain, and not merely the sympathy of analysts, particularly those of the opposing side.

Therefore, it is only natural that the Eanes candidacy be guided by a concern for keeping a certain institutional distance away from the other candidates; because power is an optimal protective screen for him (hence the reluctance with which he must confront televised debates with the strongest of his adversaries). But was it not Sa Carneiro who also refused to go to RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System] for a debate with Mario Soares? Was it not Carter who refused a televised debate with Reagan? Another essential aspect of the Eanes candidacy may be that of retaining all the mistakes which lend him strength (the mistake about independence, the mistake about no excessive political commitment to any party force, the mistake about the need for the vote from the Communist electorate, remaining aloof from the PCP).

If the Eanes campaign manages to maintain or reinforce an image based on these mistakes, it will be very difficult for it to be defeated in early December, mainly because two things would be required to defeat it: to show these mistakes to the Portuguese people, and to show the Portuguese people that, in spite of everything, the desirable president is not a president who seeks his strength from a certain type of mistake.

"First," showing that the mistakes exist, something which is now far from obvious to many citizens, even AD voters. And in politics, to a certain extent, what appears to be is.

"Second," showing that the best president for the Portugal of 1981 is not a president totally open to compromised positions, to difficult balances, to complicated transactions and to convergence that is at times anachronistic; but rather a president who is 100 percent one single reality, even though that reality may be only 45, 48 or even 51 percent of a country.

Under democracy, these explanations are more difficult than many realize, because it is precisely under democracy that it is relatively uncommon to exist permanently counting, in the plenum, on the brink of a rupture, upon repudiation of deals and compromises in day to day political, economic and social life.

There are some who make this the predominant aspect of their political activity, but they run serious risks and are liable to lose in one day all the gains of many years of political struggle.

Significance of Socialist Support

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 5-11 Sep 80 p 5

[Interview with Portuguese Socialist Party Secretariat member Jorge Sampaio, by Caceres Monteiro; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] "The decision which prompted the Socialist Party to back Gen Ramalho Eanes' independent second candidacy is correct, and the party will remain fully committed to it," declared Jorge Sampaio, aged 40, an attorney and member of the Socialist Party Secretariat, in an interview with O JORNAL during which he broke a silence that he has kept for a long while.

"Eanist? I don't know what that is!" remarked Jorge Sampaio, in response to the "accusing" rumors circulating in the PS on that matter.

Jorge Sampaio, a student leader in the associative movements during the 1962 crisis, and head of Socialist Intervention, a group which joined the PS in 1978, is one of the most prominent personages in his party, and has sometimes been referred to as the "Portuguese Rocard." He retorted: "I think that Jorge Sampaio is confined to being Jorge Sampaio."

O JORNAL: Now that the position regarding the presidential elections has finally been arrived at, what does Gen Ramalho Eanes' candidacy mean to the PS?

Jorge Sampaio: I consider it politically gratifying to see the PS, after a lengthy debate which was relatively difficult in some areas, reach the conclusion, under the current conditions in political life, acknowledging the extreme importance to democracy that this independent candidacy of Gen Ramalho Eanes can represent as a regime candidacy, which will have the backing of the PS' decisive force, with which it was also possible to reach an understanding concerning the major features of political evolution during the next few years.

This is a candidacy for the defense of the democratic regime resulting from 25 April, which has become consolidated through so many vicissitudes. It is another important contribution made by the PS toward making the democratic message for which it has striven viable. I think, as I always have, that it is important not to consider this issue in terms of party, because Gen Ramalho Eanes is not a Socialist nor a member of the PS. He is, at the present time, the president of the republic who is running again, and who is capable of polarizing all the democrats, over a vast area, who constitute the real source of defense for the democratic regime, as it appears and as it is likely to evolve. Hence, the decision which prompted the PS to back this independent second candidacy of Gen Ramalho Eanes is a correct decision, to which the party will certainly remain fully committed. The proper interpretation of the political realities has ended up prevailing, and so we have reached a correct conclusion, the only conclusion possible during the period that we are experiencing.

'Eanist? I Don't Know What That Is!'

[Question] Are there, in fact, "Eanists" within the PS?

[Answer] I think that all political parties, and the PS is no exception, have their attendant rituals and, as is also understandable at times arguments or designations created externally appear to influence the various movements or persuasions that exist in a pluralistic party such as the PS. And it is, therefore, possible that such an expression, which in my opinion makes no sense, has been used on a merely internal basis. For example, even I have been termed an Eanist, and I begin by saying that I don't know what that is. I don't think that it exists as an autonomous political design. The PS simply had to be subjected to a complicated period of selecting the presidential candidate to be supported, and this, shall we say, "mixed up" various "sentiments." Many who came out in favor of that candidacy later confined themselves, as I did, to witnessing with completed impartiality the process in the PS that led to the choice of the presidential candidate. Only they should have had patience enough not to give labels of the type that you cited, which are all the more inaccurate because they in fact do not represent a real, serious political essence.

It is obvious that the political parties, or at least some sectors of them, often tend to attach too much importance to incidents that have occurred outside of them. This occurred in the PS as well. I do not claim that a party as important as the PS, precisely because of the area that it occupies in Portuguese society, would not be capable of being affected by what is said about it or attempted to make of it outside.

'Front Will Constitute a Real Alternative'

[Question] You, Dr Jorge Sampaio, were one of the greatest advocates of the establishment of the FRS [Republican Socialist Front]. Was the original plan really achieved? Nearly a month until the elections, does the FRS have the necessary dynamics for an electoral victory?

[Answer] We can never consider ourselves satisfied with what we have achieved to date. One of the main points in the strategy established by the national commission in Porto, during January, was the creation of a Front which would cover the area of the democratic left. It was a decision the execution of which was delayed and understandably complex. That phase has been completed to a reasonable extent, and now the idea and the image of the Front exist for the entire country, and hence this is an alternative dynamic force. From now until the elections, or rather until the election campaign, I think that there is an expectation which will be created, and a movement which has now begun. The great challenge that the Portuguese political situation poses for the Front is that of establishing it as a real alternative for the Portuguese society, and the conditions for this have been created. Obviously, we are still interested in having the Front consolidate a real existence, both among the groups and personages, and having it solidify the area

that it is intended to cover; and this area is currently the only alternative for a democratic government, as opposed to a government of the right. We must have no illusions about that. And I think that this dynamic force will be consolidated, from the standpoint of our being able to perceive, at the time of the elections, that behind it and within it there is an alternative power, an alternative government, a social alternative. This is the great challenge facing the Front, and I am convinced that, with the issuance of a government program and everything that has been provided for until election day, it will constitute a real political and social alternative in this country.

[Question] One of the main criticisms made of the Front, particularly by the PC, is that the Front, of itself alone, is not an alternative, because it can only exist with the PCP. What do you think of this criticism?

[Answer] The PC always says the same thing; and hence it is only natural for the APU [United People's Alliance] to affirm it, because it already said so in 1979. But the Front has a democratic left wing design. In view of this experience of a right wing government, in view of the real interests of the large economic groups and what, in fact, is a "Caetanismo without colonies and without Caetano," the only alternative for real power is the one that the Front represents. And therefore one observes, and will notice even more, that many sectors to the left of the APU, and even to the right of us, over and above some criticism, are beginning to realize that a right wing government must necessarily be succeeded by a government formed around the Front.

There is in the Portuguese society the APU's design and, whatever its trappings may be, it is actually the PC design, different from the Front's design. And for Portugal in 1980, in a year of constitutional revision and a year of international crisis, wherein a deep solidarity is required between the social majority in this country and the need to have a democratic left wing government that would govern for that social majority and consolidate it as a political majority, I do not think that there is any reason to claim that the Front is not that political alternative to the right wing government. This cannot be accomplished with an APU government, as has been more than sufficiently explained. Therefore, if people want a useful vote in this critical election for the next 4 years, that useful vote must be for the Front, and that vote will also necessarily be a stimulus for criticism. It is proper for people to ask themselves: "Why vote?" I think that the votes which are sought are, simultaneously, a stimulus for expanding that necessary bloc as an entrenchment against the right wing. But it must also be a vote of investigation and a dynamic vote for what are the natural demands and expectations of this vast social bloc of the democratic left, which I am convinced is the majority in the country. Therefore, it is not a blank check, but rather a stimulus, an investigation, a concerned vote, an "engage" [pledged] vote, a dynamizing vote.

'Demagogic Measures From the Government Possible Only Because of the Previous Administration'

[Question] What assessment would you make of the activity during the past 6 months of AD government? Do you think that measures such as those now announced, such as the increase in pensions and in the minimum wage, may "deceive" the electorate?

[Answer] Obviously, the state of political and economic privation of some of the underprivileged sectors in this country may not inure them to measures of this type. Such measures are not possible in 4 or 5 months of government, and in this connection the exactness of the figures has been at least widely disputed, if not overtly challenged. They are possible owing to previous economic and financial administration, and I remind you of the sacrifices imposed by the PS, at least during the Second Constitutional Government. But these measures are obviously demagogic in nature, and their electoralist proclivity is linked to the intentions that this government has shown in recent months. They are not so much intentions of government management or the keeping of promises. They are screens which hide the essential issues, revolving around the way in which private accumulation or the large economic groups are to be reestablished. In addition to a smokescreen, what has been attempted is laying the essential foundations to enable the government to allow the reestablishment of the large private economic groups. This is the fundamental goal of critical sectors of the present government majority (for which they require increased authoritarianism); and what concerns me is this, and not details of electoralism which must be denounced as such. That AD plan will be carried out if the democratic left does not win the election. And that is what should concern us. The government has refused to be investigated and interrogated by democratic means, and it is no longer only the prime minister who refuses a parliamentary inquiry. This is very serious from a democratic standpoint, and increases the suspicions that may fall upon him. What we have had is a government which does not allow itself to be censured or questioned; it is a government which refuses all parliamentary inquiries. What we must always use to counter this is a qualitative alternative. It does not suffice to say that the administration may be different; it does not suffice to say that we could do A or B. We must always also explain that the democratic left government is a qualitatively different alternative, not a government for a minority, but a government for the majority.

'Avoid Making Mistakes That We Made in the Past'

[Question] Do you think that if the Front were in the government tomorrow, and the PS were by far the majority force therein, the mistakes made in the past could be repeated? Or do you think that the PS has already made its self-criticism, and has reflected on the mistakes that it made?

[Answer] We do not possess the truth; we are attentive, constant investigators of what the proper solution to our problems should be. Self-criticism, an

expression that I do not like very much, is only valuable if it involves a constant activity of checking policies and results, closely associated with everyday party activity. I think that we have already reflected somewhat on mistakes of the past, and I consider such reflection to have always been under way; however, it could be intensified further still. But, in addition, these consecutive years of government experience as opposition, and of meditation on the international factors affecting the Portuguese experience, and particularly the need that exists, through government measures taking into account the realities, but pointing in a proper direction, and markedly clear in relation to many social sectors that have still not lost confidence in democracy nor in the democratic regime, to put the FRS in a position to give to a realistic government a purpose that is also qualitatively clear, so as to socially consolidate a vast group of Portuguese, in order that the latter may reconsider their government and defend it. The experience that has been gained is very useful for preventing us from making the mistakes that we made in the past, in sectors very significant to Portuguese life, running the risk of finding ourselves dissociated from those who are traditionally the backers of a vast bloc of the democratic left.

As I said, that social majority exists, and it must now consider itself a new political majority, in a new government which will defend its interests and which, in fact, has solid criteria that are not the criteria of casuistic solutions or firemen with respect to any blaze.

[Question] How do you anticipate the near future, in the light of a possible electoral victory for the FRS, and specifically with regard to a future constitutional revision?

[Answer] The constitutional revision is called for in the present Constitution, and the mechanisms for it are also established. The PS has not made the Constitution a cause, but has made it a fundamental law which must be upheld. A set of principles for the constitutional revision which obtained the consensus of the other political forces comprising the FRS is part of the Front's agreement.

Victory in the legislative elections, which is essential to insure democracy in the future, will necessarily point to a certain constitutional revision, in which the PS will be the driving force. Obviously some consensus on this matter will be necessary but, as I said at the last congress in March 1979, the PS can and must secure consensus, it can and must secure alliances which will not jeopardize what it deems essential for its political design and for Portuguese life, which, in this specific instance, means what is essential for a democratic, constitutional system. Therefore, we are, as we always have been, opposed to anticonstitutional methods of making a constitutional revision, and it is clear that we shall seek the necessary consensus, while preserving that essential core of ideas, to achieve a revision within the legal requirements which everyone recognized as existing at the outset.

2909

CS0: 3101

SPECIAL RIKSDAG SESSION PROVES CRISIS IS REALLY POLITICAL

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Sep 80 p 9

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "No Solution of the Economic Problem Without Political Turnabout"]

[Text] The crisis in Sweden is more political than economic. That issue was made clear with considerable emphasis during the extra session of the Riksdag for tax debates. The alarming fact is that the economic crisis cannot be solved until the political crisis has been appropriately corrected.

On one side there are the three nonsocialist government parties that are in favor of increase in value-added tax and index regulated tax scales; and on the other side are the Social Democrats and LO who are against value-added tax increases and against index regulated tax scales.

These political knots will never be untied while the current personal ideas prevail in politics, where many people have pernicious hatred for each other.

Besides, the contrasts in the issues are so great that this plank would be obvious in new elections. However, there will not be new elections, because the administration believes they would lose the elections.

Only if the administration gets blocked in a corner, will there be government crisis or new elections. The next wage negotiations will most likely decide this.

On one point did the tax debate imply something new. Palme succeeded in turning it into a debate first and foremost between himself and Falldin. Bohman and Ullsten got to play the roles of small fries in the administration.

For once, Falldin was properly prepared. Therefore he could hold his own against Palme in the debate about the import depositions.

However, a new psychological aspect was probably revealed in Swedish politics. No longer does Palme lose firm supporters by systematically whipping Falldin.

Bohman Devours

Presumably it is due to the fact that Falldin, after obvious signs of action paralysis and vacillation in government, lost much of his credibility among large groups of the population.

Now, the trenches are deeper than ever in Swedish politics. And now it is coalition full steam ahead, for all it is worth.

For how long remains to be seen. After Friday's strategy, it is unavoidable that the position will be further aggravated when the fall session of the Riksdag convenes in October.

Coalition, however, cannot go on forever. At least not if the Center Party and the Liberal Party have got the lost self-preservation. Coalition is a supreme goal only for Bohman.

The present government coalition implies that Bohman devours the members of the Center Party, and that the members of the Center Party nibble on some lean member of the Liberal Party, as Palme expressed it.

But it will be difficult to dissolve the coalition without arousing any suspicion.

These difficulties apply both to the Liberal Party and the Center Party; and, to a great extent, it also applies to the Social Democrats if they want to return to government and pursue a policy that is in the interest of the whole nation.

Center Trailer

It won't do to drive on with the daily results in politics; reality must be picked up and the people must be given what they need.

The crisis of the Liberal Party has long been discussed, but the question is whether the crisis of the Center Party is not more serious.

With considerable strength, the Conservatives have conveyed the message that the present economic crisis can only be resolved by increased individualism and increased cutbacks in social benefits. Broadly speaking, the Center Party has become a trailer going towards Bohman.

Sooner or later Falldin must make a decision about which political alliances are important in order to encourage growth of the economy; a social adjustment; and improved equality policy and less environmental destruction. It will be difficult, but it is unavoidable.

Something similar also applies to Palme, as many people within his party have long practiced leftist flirtations, as well as expressing blurred hints about socialism.

The Social Democratic Party made a decent government party, but a miserable opposition. Now it is time for Palme to decide which political alliances will be necessary for the future in order to achieve certain predetermined political goals.

One thing is absolutely certain: The Social Democrats of today are extremely tired of the leftist flirtations and want more realism in politics. Some one has said that to choose is politics.

9583

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PAPER CHARGES CIVIL DEFENSE NOT PREPARED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Sep 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The inadequacy of civil defense in regard to shelters and gasmasks has recently been noted. Another important aspect of defense is foodstuffs and agricultural production.

There exists within agricultural circles marked concern over what can happen in a crisis situation or an oil stoppage. Just about a year ago a group from the Agricultural Association met with representatives from the National Board for Economic Defense to map out the state of preparedness in regard to energy for agriculture and the foodstuffs industry. The results were shocking and have necessitated preparedness measures.

Both agriculture and industry are extremely vulnerable. Both are large consumers of energy; both are dependent upon imports; both can be seriously hurt and are sensitive to disturbances of various kinds. To protect ourselves we must build up larger stores of necessary goods.

Agriculture imports, in addition to energy, seed, commercial fertilizer, oilcake foders and mineral foders, pesticides and machinery. A conversion group within the state's agricultural board has the task of investigating if we can in a crisis situation meet these needs by stockpiling or going over to domestic production.

The group believes that in regard to a stoppage of trade we are decently prepared. We can reduce our use of artificial fertilizer by one half without the crop reduction being very great in the short run. For the long term we can start domestic production of both fertilizer and oil-fodder cakes. On the other hand, preparedness in regard to pesticides is not assuring. It is anticipated that in a crisis situation there will be a change in foodstuffs consumption, with less eggs, pork and poultry, and more bread and potatoes.

The fuel requirements of agriculture are great. In the event of an oil stoppage, gengas will replace agriculture's diesel oil, but preparations are poor. There are no machines for the production of gengas units; one foresees a seven-month period of preparation before production can start and a year's production to meet the immediate need for units.

Within agricultural circles any thought of using gengas is firmly rejected. The tractors and threshers today are too big to be driven by gengas; the effect is only half the normal. Instead they want to rely on etapol as fuel. It is also recommended that the farmers themselves store up a two-years' supply of oil.

The dependency on imports for machinery and machine parts is great, and there must be preparedness stores with spare parts. But technical developments take place rapidly, and the stores must be constantly renewed. There is no longer any manufacturing of tractors since Volvo BM has united with the Finnish firm Valmet. Disturbances in the importation of machine parts were noted this spring in connection with the Finnish labor conflict.

The supply of fuel for the foodstuffs industry is almost completely based on oil, and the possibility of going over to an alternative quickly is little. There has been little preparedness by the companies, and up to the present the communities have been relied upon to provide adequate preparedness in regard to energy. At the meeting between the National Agricultural Board and the National Board for Economic Defense it became apparent that the stores were sufficient for only a short period, and consequently that the foodstuffs industry must itself take preparedness steps.

The vulnerability of the foodstuffs industry is not just caused by energy. The extensive centralization and the regional imbalance makes it very dependent upon functioning communications. The dairies and slaughterhouses are concentrated in a few places; yeast is produced at only one place in the country. There are great regional differences in milk, meat and grain production. Stockholm, for example, is completely dependent upon milk from other parts of the country.

The current agricultural and foodstuffs industry have been built up without any consideration for the preparedness and vulnerability aspects. Transport costs are still low, and no calculations are being made on the basis of increased oil prices. There must be a line where the gains of efficiency are consumed by the preparedness which efficiency promotes. To maintain large preparedness stores which must be constantly renewed is expensive and requires extensive security measures.

Another orientation of agriculture and the foodstuffs industry is required to reduce their vulnerability.

The preparedness which is being built up today is designed primarily for a stoppage in trade. There is no preparedness for a war in which the foodstuffs industry can be knocked out or parts of the country, Skane for example, occupied. It is somewhat ironical that so much effort is being devoted to a defense of the country's borders but no one appears to realize that its inhabitants can at the same time starve to death.

The poor state of preparedness in regard to foodstuffs in the event of war is dismissed by one member of the study group with the question, "Can the country cope with a war?" That's one way to view it.

6693

CSO: 3109

PAPER ANALYZES POLL RESULTS SHOWING POLARIZATION TREND

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Sep 80 p 2

[Editorial by Ake Lundqvist]

[Text] The Center Party continues to have the wind against itself, according to the Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls first fall electoral barometer.

In part, the Center suffers from the fact that the party heads the three-party government which has been criticized for a long time for its failure to take action, and now, when it appears to have reached a decision, is quite naturally unpopular. Higher taxes and restraints do not lead to equally bought opinion gains.

The Social Democrats continue to improve their opinion support and are not, according to Sifo, stronger than the three government parties together. It is primarily middle voters who have gone over. One can presume that the Institute's study will further strengthen the Social Democrats in their intention to pursue hard opposition politics up to the next election and then regain power.

On the government side the Conservatives remarkably enough seem to be able to be part of a tax increase without being the subject of a debate or perfidity by their supporters and opponents. The Institute's study should be one more alarm clock for the two middle parties.

Both are, for example, interested in important questions for the future such as the environment, decentralization and social solidarity but they are not succeeding in creating a political offensive. The middle is being pressed inward while the debate is conducted on the conditions of the Conservatives and Social Democrats. If this situation is to be changed, the middle parties must cooperate better in those things which unite them.

6893

CSO: 3109

BRIEFS

LATEST POLL RESULTS--Stockholm, 15 Sep--The first electoral barometer of the Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls for the fall shows the lowest support for the Center Party since 1967--13 percent. The socialist bloc, the Social Democrats plus the Left-wing Communist Party, has now 54 percent to the bourgeoisie 45 percent. The decline of the Center by 1.5 percent and the increase of the Social Democrats by the same figure are statistically accurate. The Social Democrats have now 48 percent compared to 46.5 in June. The Conservatives now have 24 percent (25 percent in June), the People's Party 8 (7), and the Left-wing Communist Party 6 (5). A whole 6 percent of the voters do not have or do not give a party affiliation. In June it was 5 percent, and in May 4 percent. In commenting on the situation of the Center Party, its party secretary, Allan Pettersson comments that the negative curve is continuing for the Center while the Social Democrats are still going forward. "We are aware of the difficulties of shouldering the responsibility for governing in difficult times. As a government party, we can never allow ourselves to be guided by opinion figures or doubt our role as a government party. Even unpopular measures to cope with the economic situation must be given priority. It is 2 years to the next election. During that time the opinion situation can change many times," Allan Pettersson says. [Text] (Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Sep 80 p 12) 6893

CSO: 3109

ECEVIT HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE, PARTY CRITICISM

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Sep 80 p 7

[Text] Ankara, Special -- RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit said at a press conference held yesterday to mark the 57th anniversary of the founding of the party that the RPP was constantly renewing itself and occasionally strengthening itself by pruning. He said that the exploitative order in Turkey was being snuffed out and noted that the war for economic liberation which Turkey needed would be realized with the leadership and support of the RPP and the producing public sector.

Ecevit said that the RPP was the political institution from which the War for Independence had come and drawn its people, that the opposition forces took advantage of all the opportunities of the libertarian democracy which the RPP had introduced and tried to destroy all the works of Ataturk and the RPP, but had not succeeded at this. Stating that the RPP had constantly renewed itself, strengthened itself by pruning and shown the courage to prune its own branches, Ecevit said, "The RPP has grown stronger all the time, because its roots are healthy. The roots are Ataturk's roots and the wisdom of the Turkish people." The RPP leader pointed out that there had been attempts to destroy democracy and said, "Neither democracy nor the RPP may be destroyed in Turkey. As long as the RPP lives, democracy will live; as long as democracy lives, the RPP will live. The RPP is and will be the safeguard of democracy and national unity."

Ecevit said that in recent years the RPP had been struggling on a new plane along the populist and revolutionary line and noted that new social forces had come into being as a result of the development and industrialization of society and that a new social and political balance in the nation was necessary accordingly. Explaining the need for a new balance of forces to reflect the weight of the worker, the peasant and civil servant which constituted the dynamic sectors of society, Ecevit said that the opposition forces had done everything they could to prevent this.

Source of Terrorism

RPP General Chairman Ecevit said that the source of terrorism lay at the efforts to prevent a new social and political balance. Stating that exploitation in the country was being snuffed out, Ecevit said that Turkey

needed a war of economic liberation. Noting that the RPP would initiate this war and that its leading forces would be the producing public, he said that the Turkish peasant was the point of departure for the war and that development would proceed from the peasant. "Village-towns and the public sector will spread throughout the country in our next administration," he said, adding that national unity would be restored only through the unity of the people.

Communique of the 31

In response to a question about the communique released by 31 RPP parliamentarians, Ecevit said:

"Sometimes we see releases made by taking advantage of the RPP's own internal democratic structure without thought as to whether they will be good or bad for the RPP. However, today is the RPP's 57th anniversary. It would be irresponsible of me to make a speech on such a day giving the impression that there were conflicts and splits within the RPP. Therefore, I do not wish to get into this argument, especially today."

In answer to another question, Ecevit said that the Political Parties Law was undemocratic and outmoded, that it was impossible to find another democratic nation in which the political parties did not have an organic relationship with the labor movement, the union movement, that the RPP administration had drawn up a text containing changes in this law and that the proposal would be taken before the Assembly if it was possible to reach agreement with the other parties.

Ecevit was asked, "How would the RPP prevent terrorism through a merger of social forces?" He replied:

"In trying to prevent terrorism by strengthening solidarity with social forces, we must consider first of all what it is necessary that we avoid. There are many traps along the way. If we were to come out with ways and methods similar to those of the opposition, we would fall into their trap. On the other hand, there is an opportunity to contribute along with the parties that believe in democracy to the organization of the labor movement and of the people so as to bring peace by peaceful means. We have been working on the ways and methods of doing this for some time. We will soon start initiatives in this regard. If the people are united, the power of the armed militants and activists will automatically disappear."

A reporter, referring to Ecevit's saying "in our next administration," asked whether there were any developments toward his coming to power. Ecevit asserted that they considered it a primary condition for the liberation of the nation that the RPP come to power by election and said:

"That does not have to be the only road to liberation. If the other parties, especially the JP [Justice Party], had heeded our appeals, we might have found liberation by other means through cooperation without having to wait for elections, but now the only way of liberation is for the RPP,

which brought democracy to the nation, to come to power. And for it to come to power only with the strength to preserve democracy."

Ustundag Criticizes 31

RPP General Secretary Ustundag said in a statement to the National Press Agency, "This is an example of irresponsibility. This communique is an insult to members of the RPP while pleasing the RPP's opponents. It would be improper for me as general secretary of the party to say anything further on this matter."

Ustundag added that the rumors claiming that headquarters was preparing "a declaration" against the communique of the 31 were false.

Joint Group

The RPP joint group marked the 57th anniversary of the party in its meeting yesterday.

Addressing the group, General Chairman Ecevit repeated the views expressed at the press conference and, recalling that their appeals to the JP for dialog to save Turkey from its present situation were still unanswered, said, "The JP has blocked the road leading Turkey out of the crisis."

Mausoleum Visit

RPP General Chairman Ecevit visited Ataturk's Tomb to mark the anniversary and wrote the following in the log:

"Peerless leader Ataturk,

"The Republican Peoples' Party, of which you are the founder, has protected and will protect the republic, of which you are the founder, against all attacks and attempts to destroy it from within and without.

"The RPP, which united the republic under democracy along the roads you opened, will live so long as democracy lives, and democracy will live so long as there is an RPP.

"With populism, the foundation of your modern and unifying nationalism, the RPP will establish a populist and just order in our land; with secularism, the mortar of your conception of nationalism, the RPP will restore national unity despite those who would divide our nation and drag it into internecine conflict.

"On our 57th anniversary, we present to you the eternal devotion of your party."

Caglayangil's Congratulations

Acting President Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil said in a message to RPP General Chairman Ecevit, "My warmest congratulations on the 57th anniversary of the RPP. My best wishes, love and respect to you, your valued colleagues and members on this happy occasion."

8349

CSO: 4907

STATUS OF PARTY LEADERS AFTER COUP REPORTED

Turkes Given Surrender Deadline

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 14 Sep 80 pp 1, 11

/Text/ Ankara (HURRIYET) -- As Alpaslan Turkes, former general chairman of the abolished Nationalist Action Party /NAP/, failed to comply by 1600 hours yesterday with the summonses in various National Security Council communiques, the National Security Council issued bulletin no 13 in connection with Turkes.

The bulletin, stating that unless Turkes applies to the nearest garrison by 1300 hours today, he will become a fugitive, is as follows:

"1. As stated by the chairman of the National Security Council in addresses on Turkish radio and television on 12 September 1980, the leaders of four political parties were requested to live temporarily at specific locations for the purpose of having their safety under custody of the Armed Forces.

"2. Despite the compliance of three party leaders with this summons, it is seen that Nationalist Action Party General Chairman Alpaslan Turkes did not comply, that he left his home and, despite his being requested in Ankara Martial Law Command bulletins to apply to the nearest garrison command in compliance with the above bulletin, he has not at this time done so.

"3. If Nationalist Action Party General Chairman Alpaslan Turkes does not apply to the nearest garrison command by 1300 hours on 14 September 1980, he will be declared guilty of failing to comply with Ankara Martial Law Command bulletins and the orders of the National Security Council."

"Kenan Evren

"General, Chief of Staff and National Security Council Chairman"

Turkes Surrenders in Ankara

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Sep 80 p 6

/Text/ Ankara, Special -- With 6 hours left before the deadline, NAP General Chairman Alpaslan Turkes sought out the authorities from the home of his son who lives in Gaziosmanpasa in Ankara and was escorted from that home, it was learned. The General Staff Secretariat General did not release the address.

After Turkes, who reportedly surrendered at 3/3 Kader Street in Gaziosmanpasa in Ankara, was taken to Uzunada in Izmir, it was learned that his son, Turgut Turkes, whose home was, was taken into custody for a while but later released.

Neighbors said that the house where Turkes' son Tugrul Turkes, a student at Hacettepe University, lives belongs to Alpalsan Turkes. They said that troops led by an officer had come in the early morning hours on Friday and repeatedly knocked on the door and rang the bell but no one answered, so the soldiers opened the door with a key and went inside, then shortly after, left the house. They said that Tugrul Turkes had been in the house during the two intervening days but they definitely had not seen Alpalsan Turkes and did not even see Turkes taken from the house yesterday morning.

Alpalsan Turkes' name was seen on the no 3 mailbox at the house entrance but no names appeared on the apartment doors.

The General Staff Secretariat General made no announcement of the address of the house where Turkes surrendered. When asked by MILLIYET, the General Staff secretary general said that he gave the address of the house where Turkes was to the Ankara Martial Law Command and that he did not remember it completely but said only that it was a house in Gaziosmanpasa.

NAP General Chairman Alpalsan Turkes was taken from the house to the Garrison Command and later was flown to Uzunada off Izmir.

NAP Headquarters Searched

Last Friday morning immediately after the Turkish Armed Forces took control of the entire country, the NAP General Headquarters on Third Avenue in Bahcelievler was thoroughly searched. According to the information obtained in this regard, incriminating elements such as rifles, pistols and remote control explosives were confiscated from the basement of the NAP Headquarters. Also confiscated from the headquarters were money receipts written to DEV-GENC /Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation/ and DEV-YOL /Revolutionary Road/ and placards and posters inscribed with leftist slogans.

Meanwhile, all documents and files at the NAP Headquarters were confiscated by security forces and taken away for investigation.

Situation Report on Party Leaders

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Sep 80 p 6

/Text/ RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit and JP /Justice Party/ General Chairman Suleymen Demirel, who were taken into protective custody by the Turkish Armed Forces at Hamzakoy in Gelibolu, told a MILLIYET reporter who reached them by telephone from Istanbul that they "were fine." NSP/National Salvation Party/ General Chairman Erbakan also told an AA /Anatolian Agen reporter who talked with him by telephone that "Thanks to Allah, I am fine." Alpaslan Turkes could not yet be reached by phone in his room as he had just arrived at Uzunada.

Some news agencies and newspapers, with permission of the authorities, called relatives of the leaders yesterday and had brief conversations with them.

Ecevit

Ecevit has had telephone conversations from Gelibolu with relatives in Ankara, RPP General Secretary Mustafa Ustundag and his mother in Istanbul.

Ecevit asked in these conversations for certain personal items and books. Mrs Ecevit also talked with her sister Asude Aral and had her send some things she needed. The Ecevits have been allowed a television, according to those who talked with them.

It is understood as a result of the telephone conversations that the rooms where Ecevit and Demirel are staying are rather close.

Moreover, RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit said in a conversation with a MILLIYET reporter that he could not make any political statement and that the commanders whom he had known for a long time would give the best information about the situation.

Stating that he had talked with his relatives by telephone and that his health was fine, Ecevit said that he was keeping up with the news on radio and television and the newspapers.

Asked how long he would be there, he said, "I do not know; it is not specific right now." Ecevit said he was passing the time reading books and working but he did not answer the question, "What book are you reading at the moment?"

The NATIONAL PRESS AGENCY reported that Ecevit had said in a telephone conversation with former Tokat National Deputy Omer Dedeoglu that he was well and was being treated very well and had said, "I do not think I will be here very long."

Demirel

When told that he could make telephone calls if he wished, JP General Chairman Suleyman Demirel first called JP General Secretary Nahit Mentese in Ankara and talked for some time. Demirel reportedly told Mentese that he was well and did not need anything.

Demirel also called some of the former JP parliamentarians, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil and former Minister of State Ekrem Ceyhun.

The Demirels also called their home on Guniz Street.

Hayrettin Gokdemir, who has managed the Demirel household for a long time, talked with Nazmiye Demirel, who made the telephone call. Nazmiye Demirel said that her husband, Suleyman Demirel, was "watching the news on television" and that "he is well." Stating that she, too, was well and that they were comfortable, Nazmiye Demirel asked Hayrettin Gokdemir not to leave the house and to carry on the household affairs as normal. When Hayrettin Gokdemir asked, "How is Mr Suleyman?" she replied, "Very well, he is comfortable."

Sevket Demirel spoke with Mrs Demirel later. Nazmiye Demirel told Sevket, "Don't worry. He wants it this way. He told me, 'Don't let them worry so much. Whatever is best will be done. It is all for the good of the country.' Rest assured, there is nothing to worry about." Nazmiye Demirel later had a brief conversation with her brother's wife, Fusun Sener.

Erbakan

NSP General Chairman Necmettin Erbakan also told the AA reporter who called him at Izmir's Uzunada and asked, "How are you?": "Thanks to Allah, I am fine." During this telephone conversation, Erbakan said that he was passing the time "giving thanks to Allah, listening to the radio, that he would have a TV soon and that he had no difficulties." Asked, "Do you have any message?" he said, "May it be for the best."

Turkes

The AA reporter also asked to talk by telephone with NAP General Chairman Alpaslan Turkes who was taken into protective custody at Uzunada by the Turkish Armed Forces yeaterday. He was unable to do so, however, as a telephone has not yet been installed in the room where Turkes, who arrived yesterday, will being staying.

8349

CSO: 4907

TURKISH PRESS EVALUATES 12 SEPTEMBER COUP

'CUMHURIYET' Evaluates Post-Coup Situation

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 14 Sep 80 pp 1,7

/Article by Ugur Mumcu: "Henceforth..."/

/Text/ The Armed Forces' seizing full control of the administration all along the chain of command is as natural as rain. It is a rule that every action has a reaction. If the state ceases to be the state, if parliament fails to elect a president which it ought to have done in a couple of weeks, if the nation is turned into a bloody arena of civil war from one end to the other, what could be more natural than the Armed Forces' seizing control? The outcome is not surprising.

It has been a full 30 years since the day we set out on the multiparty system road. The first decade of these 30 years was marked by the 27 May Revolution; the 12 March Memorandum followed the 27 May Revolution 11 years later; 9 years after the 12 March Memorandum, on 12 September 1980, the Armed Forces seized control with its entire hierarchy. Revolutionary attempts such as 22 February and 21 May occurred in the meantime.

Since 1950, including 12 September, martial law has been proclaimed fully nine times. Our 30 years of multiparty life have drawn an interesting political picture with one of every two years under martial law.

If we list these facts one after the other, the outcome emerges automatically: We have been unable to carry out the multiparty system, populist and libertarian democracy and the constitutional order; we have drowned the legal state in a sea of blood; we do not understand what democracy is and, more important, the least thing about what it is not!

This is a declaration of bankruptcy. This outcome means the complete bankruptcy of the cadres which have guided us, or thought they were guiding us, for the past 30 years and of their political thought.

Indeed, no one has anything to say to anybody: This outcome is not a surprise, it was expected. What else could there be, what else could be expected in this sea of blood, in this upheaval? If a parliament cannot elect a president, which ought to have been elected within a couple of weeks, in 6 months of incredible hardheadedness, what is there to say? In an atmosphere in which 20 citizens per day are giving their lives, who can speak of the legal state, the Constitution and democracy? Certainly, an end had to be put to this inflation and devaluation, this sea of blood. And it was.

We all lived through the 1960 revolution. The Armed Forces which seized power in May 1960 presented to the civilian administration, in the words of General Cevat Gursel, the leader of that revolution, "a parliament whose walls were unstained with curses." The civilian administration never understood the value of this gift. If the military administration which took over after the 12 March turmoil had wanted to, it could have become a permanent military administration, but the 12 March administration opened the doors to the civilian administration. That in his first announcement, Chief of Staff and National Security Council Chairman General Evren should say that their purpose was to establish "an administration based on the rule of libertarian democratic, secular and social law which gave importance to the peace and comfort of the individual and society" shows that the sound tradition of returning to civilian administration has been kept alive in our Armed Forces.

This has another result also: The Turkish Armed Forces have never considered establishing a lasting and permanent military administration despite all the incidents which have kept happening since the day we took our first steps into the multiparty system. This attitude is a great comfort, the value of which will be understood long after.

Great events such as these must contribute to understanding the causes which underlie the crises we are experiencing. We have not to date established a permanent and lasting "civilian administration." Henceforth, let us take advantage of our experience and all think together on how we will establish an administration "based on the rule of libertarian, democratic, secular and social law."

'TERCUMAN' Comments on Coup's Meaning

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 14 Sep 80 pp 1,9

[Article by Nazlı Ilıcak: "12 September Operation"]

[Text] We concluded our 12 September column with this sentence: "It seems that we are riding the wind, heading for a day of reckoning."

And the day of reckoning came. It may not be the end of the world, but it is the end of democracy. Political party activity has been suspended; parliament has been dissolved. Parliamentary immunity of national deputies and senators has been lifted.

Freedom is the food, water and bread of our newspapermen. The more we reveal our inner thoughts, the clearer they become and the more we contend with the strong proofs of an opposing idea, the stronger we become. We believe that "the sword of truth is born in the clash of ideas." Reality may be found only in the exchange of ideas. Many times we have seen an idea that we believed to be true collapse before a different point of view.

A fish can live only in water and a reporter only in multiparty democracy, because our duty is not just to applaud. So when we heard about the operation, we took a deep breath.

It would be easy to blame the political cadres, saying, "Didn't we tell you so?" It would be easy to knock them when they are down, unable to talk and defend themselves. But we are not going to do this; we will wait until they take their places again within the democratic system to call them to account. Quite the opposite, we are going to defend them today. If we want democracy to return as soon as possible, we must try to keep the political cadre on its feet.

Leaders do not have an easy time; everybody blames them. But it is necessary to see that this censure is exaggerated and not let it hide their positive sides. The wholesale elimination of politicians would create voids impossible to fill in Turkish political life.

It is possible to read the following lines, which still retain their freshness, from the late constitutional professor Ali Fuat Başgil to judge the 12 September operation:

"In nations where the culture of freedom has not developed, the regime of freedom is condemned to being dynamite in the hands of a child, and democracy first to demagoguery and then to a conversion to anarchy. A reaction to the anarchy is then inevitable. The regime of freedom comes and goes in these nations, much like the sun as it comes and goes behind winter clouds. This is natural, because democracy is a regime of moderation and balance between despotism and chaos. If despotism is one rung above this regime, anarchy is one rung below. Nations lacking the culture of freedom are prone to lose their moderation and balance and as a result are forced to choose between despotism and chaos. Since chaos is a calamity rightly feared by the people, countries faced with this choice always prefer despotism and take refuge in a Noah's Ark of their own creation to keep from drowning in the flood of chaos. This is, generally speaking, the psychological reason behind their initial welcoming of dictators with the respect due a savior."

The perpetuation of democracy depends only on preserving the balance between authority and freedom. Discipline without freedom is characteristic of a totalitarian regime, but freedom without discipline means disruption and chaos.

Bağcı said the following on this:

"To picture freedom as without discipline and to take freedom to mean disruption is to pervert the ideal of freedom. A mistaken idea about freedom is that it means everyone acts as he wishes. This can never be freedom, but is a conceit and an evil which leads to chaos. The power and will to act as one wishes belong only to God Almighty. And even God has his own divine law to moderate his supreme will and absolute power in the orderly universe he created himself.

"What lies at the foundations of the discipline of society is unity. Civilized freedom is possible to the extent that everyone is committed to and respects the laws of the country. A tight relationship is seen between freedom and the concept of law. And as a result, freedom is an atmosphere and a climate that occurs when everyone has equal respect for and submission to the law."

Democracy in Turkey has become demagoguery and anarchy. The balance between authority and freedom slipped away from the former, and a breakdown of authority occurred. The Turkish Armed Forces took up this slack. The announced goal is "to prepare an environment conducive to the functioning of democracy."

How soon our people and our nation will be at peace depends on how quickly this environment is formed.

'HURRIYET' Assesses Significance of Coup

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 14 Sep 80 pp 1,13

[Article by Cunevt Arcayurek: "Turkey is a Democratic, Secular Nation"]

[Text] Ankara -- Like all men who love their country, we must now look to the future, not the past. While speaking of the future and turning once more after 20 years to efforts to put our life on sound principles, we must not, however, fail to bear in mind the lessons derived from the painful experience of the past.

During the hours when the army intervention was taking place, a top commander with whom I have talked frequently said to me, "Don't you want to be able to leave your house and go over to your next door neighbor's at night in safety? This is what has to be done first of all."

Even in past days when great claims and problems were being debated, the sense and sensibility of the public existed in this very sentence.

The kernel of this simple sentence underlay all the important thrusts such as demands for laws to preserve the democratic order and appeals for unity. When the army was issuing a series of warnings since 1979 and we were

writing about them, practically none of the fanatics and fools considered whether we were reflecting facts, but just as they were pushing everything as far as it would go, seemed willing to let us write any slander we wanted to in order to keep pressure on the politicians.

Let us summarize: In 1979, the Army had told the top civilian administrators at almost every official meeting, including the National Security Council and even in private conversations, what had to be done to get Turkey out of its misfortune. There were not many who understood the seriousness of the matter when, in August 1979, we appealed in HURRIYET to the leaders of the two large parties for unity, requested that they get together on the major elements of the republic and succeeded in this at that time. However, the principles which were announced when HURRIYET got the two leaders together around a text included the "traditional rules" of the Republic of Turkey committed to the secular, democratic and legal state.

Commitment to Republic

And the army -- as we knew -- was firmly committed to the traditional rules within the secular, democratic and legal order of the republic which Ataturk founded and showed most recently that it still is.

Let no one pass it off with a smile or rush to the mistaken conclusion that we are writing this way, tooting our horn, after the army intervention. Quite a few people in Turkey are afflicted with poor memories, but newspaper collections cannot lose their memories. If they look, they will see that we have written these things many times.

The army officially requested certain legal changes in order to root out anarchy. It has always told every official -- sometimes in writing, sometimes orally -- what its major demands were, such as a state of emergency law, a state security courts law, revision of the elections law to rectify Assembly arithmetic and even review and revision of certain articles of the constitution. We have reported in this context that the army proposed to reorganize within the democratic rules everything from labor disarray to economic considerations.

We have written every last bit of it.

A different drum was marched to. Many made fun of one prime minister's hesitancy when listing these demands to come out and say they were the army's demands and said, "He is trying to institute some system or other in the nation."

In short, they held themselves aloof, turning a deaf ear to these demands which the army set forth clearly in the "warning letter" of 1 January 1980. I am still surprised that anyone would even argue that these warnings were empty threats.

Ataturkism

The army showed its traditional Ataturkism at this last stage and pulled off the intervention. I know personally that General Evren has no taste for such interventions and does not desire them. I have talked with him repeatedly. On every occasion he has explained sincerely with all good will that he favors having the sectors of power do what they think is necessary for the nation and has expressed his anxiety about the failure to achieve results. Finally, General Evren is the head of the army and the army, being a force traditionally committed to Ataturkism, might one day "be forced to do what could not be done."

This act of being forced was realized on the day and night of 12 September.

Now look at the text of General Evren's television address. You will not see a single line different from what we have been writing since 1979. The demands of months and years were all there in the text of this speech.

Evren's address to the new administrative cadres which will come with the army intervention is a varied program.

As there is now a program before us with its goals specified and whose purpose is to base democratic life on sounder rules, the goal of the new government to be formed will certainly be found in light of these rules.

The new "executive organ" or, in simpler terms, government, must work to realize this goal without delay, entering a new legislative session. The intervention has taken place; post-intervention has now begun to become important.

Without Delay

If the establishment of a constituent assembly is foremost, then an important stage will be reached with the formation of this constituent assembly and its beginning to function. If a new constitution is to be written or if the present one is to be revised, the constituent assembly must be expected to perform this function without delay as soon as it is formed.

Ought not everything, from the swift working of the courts to a variety of laws to strengthen the Turkish state in the future in order to prevent anarchy, to be prepared and realized in such a way as to be indisputable in the future of the democratic republic?

I have talked with Justice Party members and RPP members involved in party administration.

Every one of them said that the intervention was unavoidable and stated candidly that the "last chance we have is for the army administration to succeed." Ustundag /RPP General Secretary/ said this, and Orhan Eren said this.

Our last chance must succeed.

This is a very important trial.

In order for the last chance to succeed, however, it will be necessary that those who use this chance have everyone's help and cooperation. The first, indeed the only, condition of the "last chance" in order that the democratic order may run smoothly in the future is that everyone get back to democracy as soon as possible and that all good will coalesce at this stage in order that our army may return immediately with an easy mind to its true duty.

We may attain the goal by relinquishing certain personal obsessions and convictions and taking the same road together in order that democracy may flourish again in future days and that the traditional Atatürkism may continue. Other roads leading to left or right must never be allowed to stop our confident march on this main road.

Everyone, whether military or civilian, knows that the Turkish polity is secular, democratic at heart and amenable to common sense and democracy.

If those who serve in the new administration understand the duty to achieve this result quickly, then in support of them, everyone who desires the democratic, secular and legal order must do his part to help the new administrators.

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INTERIOR MINISTER ADDRESSES ANARCHY ISSUE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11 Sep 80 pp 1,12

/Text/ Ankara (MEDITERRANEAN AGENCY) -- The "Security Commission" which is to make a general evaluation of anarchy, terrorism and separatist activities in Turkey met yesterday in Ankara, chaired by Interior Minister Orhan Eren, who said, "Anarchy and terrorism cannot achieve its goal in our country as it has everywhere in the world; the rule of law and order will absolutely prevail."

Besides Interior Minister Orhan Eren, other participants in the meeting to discuss public order problems are Undersecretary Durmus Yalcin, Gendarmerie General Commander General Sedat Celasun, top officials from the General Staff, Security Directorate General and Interior, justice, national education and customs and monopolies ministries and the governors of Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Konya, Samsun, Adana, Gaziantep and Denizli.

Minister's Words

Delivering the opening address at the meeting, Interior Minister Orhan Eren pointed out that all institutions and organizations had to use every resource possible for the success of martial law and the administration. He said:

"Success in this regard will be the direct success of the state and the nation. Let no one doubt that we will do everything we can for the success of this struggle as long as we exist, whether in power or in the opposition. Let me say forthrightly that the martial law commands, security forces and civil administration supervisors have first responsibility in the struggle with anarchy, terrorism and subversion in our provinces whether under martial law or not. But this is not to say that other institutions and organizations will be left out.

"The struggle will be taken up with new methods and techniques, being constantly analyzed against changing and developing conditions and the terrorism, anarchy, separatism and subversion problem will be pushed to the bottom of the list on Turkey's agenda."

Demirel's Message

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel pointed out that it was the "foremost duty of the state to ensure the reign of law and order" and said, "The citizenry and the state are despondent. This malaise is a national problem. It has nothing to do with politics."

Demirel sent Interior Minister Orhan Eren a message on the Security Commission in which he said the following:

"The foremost duty of the state is to ensure the reign of law and order. The result of this is safety of life and property. A nation's government does this by legitimate means, staying on legitimate grounds and using the legitimate powers of the state. This is the badge of the state.

"If there is any breakdown in the performance of this duty, it must be identified and eliminated.

"Today in Turkey, there is not only a breakdown in the performance of this duty but the quintessence of the legal state and the integrity of the regime, the nation and the people are also being abused and attacked. There is no need to say that this has reached the point of serious crisis.

"The state and the nation have their work cut out for them. No one should pit the resources and capabilities of those who aggrieve Turkey against the power of the state. In the end, the tools of treason, the murderers and criminals will suffer the punishment of the state."

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'MILLIYET' CALLS FOR INTERIM CONSTITUTION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 20 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] With the members of the National Security Council taking their oaths and pledging themselves to the Turkish nation as the instruments for resolving all the Republic's problems, we have put behind us a number of major developments of the last period.

Now the entire world knows that the ultimate goal--stated many times and included in the oath--is the establishment of constitutional system "predicated upon the principles of a democratic and secular republic." Moreover, the oath taken by the National Security Council members embodies the essence of the president's oath of office in the 1961 Constitution. The basic differences are that this time there obviously is no constitution and that those sworn in personally shoulder the responsibility for making the rules they are to follow in future.

The institution of the oath, both in political traditions and in constitutions, aims at placing the integrity of an individual appointed to a post or charged with a duty face to face with the rules to which he must adhere before public scrutiny.

As the Council members have taken their oaths and assumed their duties, the first phase has ended for the 12 September period in which communiques and announcements flowed for a week. The start of the second phase came with the swearing in. We might say that the end of this phase will come with the announcement and promulgation of the "interim constitution."

But meanwhile it would not be incorrect to say that the outline of the new state structure is clear...Based on the picture emerging from announcements, impressions, and news, we can define the structure as follows...

Legislative authority has been concentrated in the National Security Council. The National Security Council has been charged with executive functions. Meanwhile, the authority of the Council of Ministers has been assumed by ministerial undersecretaries acting for the National Security Council. The chief of the executive and legislative branches and thus of the state is General Kenan Evren.

General Evren, moreover, is head of a Military Council composed of 14 senior commanders within which sit the members of the National Security Council and the Council Secretary. At a time when there is as yet no interim constitution, we believe it would not be wrong to characterize the Military Council as an advisory body.

Beyond this structure we can say that other organs of the 1961 constitutional system continue to function. As a matter of fact, the only ones absent in the protocol arrangements announced at the ceremony were the Senate President, Assembly Speaker, Prime Minister, and party leaders. Outside of these figures the ranking, beginning with the President of the Constitutional Court, is as before.

As we have said, to reach a new phase a council of ministers and an interim constitution must be announced. The constituent assembly and a new constitutional system will follow this. In the end we will return to elections and democracy.

CSO: 4907

GOVERNMENT FOREIGN POLICY SPARKS NSP ATTACK

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 9 Sep 80 pp 1,7

/Text/ In a written press release yesterday, NSP /National Salvation Party/ Deputy General Chairman Suleyman Arif Emre said, "The JP /Justice Party/ mentality has blocked Turkey's development by halting the progress of heavy industry and the war industry and is blindly tied to the West."

The following is the verbatim text of NSP Deputy General Chairman Suleyman Arif Emre's statement!

"Those who for years have enslaved our country to Jewish capital and those who cooperate with them, those who have written foreign policy to comply with the interests of Israel and never given concession from it have recently begun a chorus of attacks on National Salvation, saying our interpellation affected the interests of Israel."

"This mentality is a mentality which has blocked Turkey's development by halting the progress of heavy industry and the war industry and is blindly tied to the West. This mentality is a mentality which does not desire Turkey's economic independence and aims to destroy the middle class in a money lenders' contest."

"It is the same mentality which destroys working capital by making usury legal and puts production in a horrible decline, which crushes the nation under hunger, deprivation and high prices."

"It is the same mentality which with international begging instead of development through its own power, cares nothing for the honor and prestige of our nation."

"And finally it is the same mentality which, when we were fighting for our independence, opposed this and said, 'There is no other way for us to live, the world is divided into two camps. Let us, too, join the American camp in order to live.'"

"The same mentality is now trying to deceive our nation by hiding behind Ataturk."

"This exploitation will do them no good. Those who drag the country into disaster, who smear it in blood from one end to the other cannot exploit Ataturk to show what they are doing as good.

"Their masks are now off. Our beloved nation, tied to the spirit and meaning of our war for independence, is no longer deceived by the members of this Western club. And what we are doing nationally today is the same thing. We are fighting Turkey's war for economic independence. We are working for a personalized foreign policy, for economic and political cooperation with the Muslim nations with which we share common material and moral bonds, not with Israel. That the JP and the parties and people who support it are so attached to Israel that they will sacrifice their ministers, their administration and even their party rather than be separated from Israel is useful from the standpoint of showing what this mentality is.

"The great Assembly has rejected this pro-Israel foreign policy and dismissed the foreign minister.

"Like everyone else, the JP and those who support it must respect this decision.

"Victory belongs to the believers, and victory is near."

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'TERCUMAN' COMMENTS ON REPUBLIC'S LOST VITALITY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 10 Sep 80 pp 1,12

/Article by Nazlı Ilıcak: "From Young Republic to Tired Republic"/

/Text/ The Ottoman State, suffering defeat in World War I, was forced to sign the Montreux ceasefire agreement. The Allied Powers, on the basis of article 7 of this agreement, occupied many regions of the country claiming that their security was endangered. In this connection, they gave Izmir to Greece, with whom we were not in a position to go to war. (15 May 1919)

Mustafa Kemal, one day later on 16 May, left for Samsun on the Bandirma Steamer. And thus began the War for Independence which was to make our country free and which ended by driving the Greeks into the sea at Izmir on 9 September 1922.

Yesterday was 9 September. The day marking the end of a great war to transform a tired and divided Ottoman State into a young republic. Years passed and great strides were taken toward the future along the road carved out by Ataturk.

In 1927, Turkey had a population of 13.648 million and a per capita national income (at fixed prices) of 522 liras. In 1977, the population had risen to 42 million and national income /per capita/ to 4,765 liras. The population had tripled, but despite this, the per capita national income (at fixed prices) rose almost 10-fold. Our nation had a growth rate of 6.6 percent in the first plan period (1963-1967), 7.1 percent in the second plan period (1968-1972), and 6.5 percent in the third plan period (1973-1977), taking top positions among world nations in rate of development.

When the republic was proclaimed, the government's headquarters did not even have electricity. In 1950, only 13 villages had electricity. In 1977, 11,200 villages and two-thirds of the village population had lights. Turkey, able to produce 77 million kilowatt hours of electricity in 1923 and 790 million kilowatt hours in 1950, exceeded 21 billion kilowatt hours in 1977.

In 1950, straight pins, safety pins, snaps, hooks and eyes, string, cord and tape, in short, everything from the needle to the thread, was imported, while today we manufacture all these things ourselves.

Turkey was not standing still. It was not sitting in poverty. It had trained manpower, extensive resources. The republic Ataturk founded took root and the love of freedom became an inalienable precept in the heart of the people. The principle of social justice developed and, as the state became strong enough, it extended a helping hand to the retiree, the widow, the orphan. The right to strike and collective labor bargaining came and censorship of the press disappeared.

Our young republic which has many things to its credit in the past is today confronted by great danger. Democracy has become demagoguery and freedom, anarchy. The voice of pseudo-Khomeyni's has risen and bigotry stalks the land. Mr Erbakan, deigning not to visit Ataturk's Tomb or to join in national celebrations, has begun to twist the RPP and the Justice Party around his little finger. At the Konya rally, placards bore old Turkish, green banners were waved, and disrespectful upstarts sat down while the "Independence March" was sung. Two NSP /National Salvation Party/ parliamentarians were on the planning committee; one of them we know very well from the Constitution Committee, Sener Battal. The same person who, when asked by reporters to comment on the incident involving derision of Ataturk at the mosque, has said: "I find the incident extremely interesting."

A vague answer exactly like Erbakan's: "I am neither for nor against 30 August; I am right in the middle of it."

The NSP is taking advantage of the delicate balance in the Assembly to chip concession after concession off the constitutional principles.

All these things are a result of the Elections Law. It started out from the idea that "the majority should not be given the opportunity to oppress the minority," and in the end the large parties have become a tool to the whim of the small ones. Thus, there has been slippage from the center off to the left and the right and the chasm has deepened. The extremists are getting political patronage at the cost of deviating from the principles of Ataturk and running roughshod over the constitution and our laws which envisaged the Turkish republic on a central path.

The primary reason for the failure to elect a president and parliament's inability to function is the electoral law, which makes it impossible to form a majority. In an environment where the institutions are not working properly, it is natural for democracy to slide into demagoguery and the idea of freedom into anarchy.

Early elections have been taken off the agenda for the time being. At least, let us take this opportunity to lay the basis for a sounder future by revising the elections law. Perhaps then the "tired republic" can squeak through and we can restore to our political life the excitement of its first days and a level conducive to democracy.

BASE PRICE SETTING MINDFUL OF INFLATION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 13 Sep 80 p 4

/Text/ The real value of the base prices, which are generally 80 percent to 100 percent higher, "is being absorbed" by price increases of basic production inputs and consumer goods.

CUMHURİYET Economic Service -- The support purchase prices announced annually in Turkey are very important to the producers, the nearly 60 percent of the population which works in the agricultural sector and obtains a livelihood from this sector. This practice, intended to protect the producer, occasionally becomes a political vehicle of governments and tends to be evaluated according to "percentage of increase" alone, ignoring many auxiliary elements of the base prices.

In fact, this has happened again this year, with constant reminders that the base prices announced so far have all increased nearly 100 percent. Base prices have been announced for almost all basic agricultural products except tobacco, with the increases ranging between 80 percent and 100 percent. However, one is being asked to ignore the fact that in addition to the base price increases, there have also been increases in the producers' basic inputs, diesel fuel, motor oil, electricity and especially fertilizer. Also, there is no mention of the price hikes on such products as food and consumer goods each of which the producers have to use as consumers.

Among the base prices announced, sunflowers are 30 liras, up from 12-16 liras in 1979; wheat is 10.5 liras, up from 5 liras; cotton is 50 liras, up from 25 liras. The base price of sugar beets, which retain their position among the important agricultural products, rose to 3 liras from 1.3 liras, tea rose from 14.5 liras to 25 liras and grapes rose from 45 liras to 75 liras.

On the other hand, the flood of price hikes in the wake of the 25 January decisions brought a 100 percent increase in the price of diesel fuel, 120 percent in motor oil, 250 percent in stages in electricity and, in fertilizer, 40 percent. Prices of basic consumer items from bread to light

bulbs, from cleaning supplies to cloth have risen more than 100 percent and these increases continue from day to day. Despite all the contradictions of the government authorities, the inflation rate in the first half of the year was around 130 percent.

In addition, the producers, especially wheat and tea producers, assert that the payments which should have been made when the base prices were announced have not been made and point out that billions of liras in back payments have not been given to them. Because the base price announcements are already rather late, producers who had to sell their products to merchants at low prices are saying, "The directors of the economy announced a long time ago that they could absorb the income that would pass into the possession of the producer in order to apply their monetary policy. Now we all understand how they are doing it."

Producer representatives maintain the view that "it is impossible for the base prices announced to bring the producers an increase in real income or purchasing power. It is possible to do this only by balancing the cost of living and basic input prices with support purchase prices."

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TELEPHONE BOOM HITS ISTANBUL

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Afsin Yigitkeskin]

[Text] Within 2 months after the ministry preference was eliminated, 3,000 applications for the "expensive preference" telephones came to the Istanbul Telephone Directorate General in addition to the normal list, and half of them have been installed. Authorities pointed out that 15,000 telephones were allotted to Istanbul for the first 8 months of the year and said that 70 percent of these were earmarked for applicants on the normal list.

The petition method has now been eliminated in Istanbul, where about 600,000 are on the waiting list for telephones, and instead one fills out a "telephone request form" obtained from the Telephone Directorate General, it was learned.

30 Percent Prefer "Expensive"

While it was pointed out by Telephone Directorate General officials that they try to fill telephone requests quickly in Istanbul according to what the grid can handle, it was learned that there are 335,000 subscribers at the moment, that 15,000 people got new telephones in the past 8 months and 10,000 transfer requests were fulfilled.

According to the information given, 2,000 people applied for immediate telephone installation after the ministry preference was eliminated in June and the Telephone Directorate General began giving "expensive" preference telephones instead. Half of the 3,000 expensive preferences and about 1,000 ministry preferences from before were installed by the Telephone Directorate General within 2 months. Explaining in this context that they were trying to fulfill normal telephone requests also, the officials said, "The expensive preference telephone does not exceed 30 percent of the distribution but is drawing attention to fulfillment of the 70 percent of normal telephones."

As is known, the preferred "expensive" telephones given by the Telephone Directorate General are installed at a cost of 90,000 liras, 75,000 liras or 60,000 liras depending on the time periods and half of the money is deposited at time of application.

The Telephone Directorate General eliminated the first telephone applications and substituted the filling out of a telephone request form which is printed by the administration and contains all sorts of information.

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